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INTERVIEWS WITH HMA DIRECTORS

MAJOR GENERAL J. M. COWAN, CBE DSO
James Cowan is CEO of The HALO Trust (HALO), a leading NGO clearing the debris of
war with over 8,500 staff in 24 countries. At a time of unprecedented, man-made humanitarian crises, HALO’s work has never been more important.
James was a soldier for 30 years, serving in Germany, Northern Ireland, Africa, Hong
Kong, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He commanded his regiment, The Black Watch, in Iraq in 2004
during fighting in Basra and subsequently around Fallujah. He was back in Iraq in 2006–
2007, again in Basra. He took command of Task Force Helmand and served in Afghanistan
during 2009–2010. He was subsequently Head of Counter Terrorism in the British Ministry
of Defence and led the planning for the 2012 Olympics military security operation. His last
job in the British Army was as General Officer Commanding the 3rd (U.K.) Division.
James left the British Army in 2015 to become CEO of HALO. He read modern history at Oxford and took a Masters of
Philosophy at Cambridge and has a long-standing interest in military history and the Napoleonic Wars. He is married to
Minnie with three children and lives in Dorset, United Kingdom.
1. In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the
conventional weapons destruction (CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) community today (funding, strategic planning, governance, development approaches,
staffing, political interference, networking of organizations within uncertain political and external environments, etc.); how are they typically overcome?
As we enter our third decade of work, the mine action sector
faces two challenges: first, we need to fulfill the promise to the
millions of forgotten people who continue to live in fear from
explosive remnants of war (ERW). Secondly, we must adapt to
the current and future humanitarian requirements caused by
war; far more people are being harmed by this second category.
Legacy contamination. Landmines remain as dangerous as
ever to the 60 million people affected by them worldwide, restricting access to land, livelihoods, and endangering the lives of those
who live nearby. Despite this continued danger, funding of legacy mine action programs remains a challenge. We must respect
competing humanitarian priorities, without allowing donor fatigue, or diminishing foreign aid budgets to damage our work.
The Landmine Free 2025 (http://landminefree2025.org)
campaign seeks to change this narrative and reinvigorate support to achieve completion in as many places as possible by
2025. Completion is possible and achievable with the right financial and political commitment from both donor and affected states, but will take innovative thinking and agility to
achieve. As such, we are exploring innovative solutions that
have been developed in other sectors, such as alternative funding mechanisms and social financing that may provide additional support to mine action.
Improvised explosive devices (IED). In addition to legacy
mine problems, the mine action sector is also confronting new
contamination in many regions. IEDs are not new, and in the
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majority of cases, they fall under the globally agreed definition of landmines. However, the new use of these weapons and
massive scale of IED contamination in the Middle East and
other regions, leading to a considerable increase in casualties,
give reason to develop new techniques, training, and methods
to meet the evolving nature of modern landmines.
Urban clearance. Linked to the proliferation of improvised
mines and the changing nature of warfare is the requirement for large-scale, urban rubble clearance and reconstruction. The physical challenge of destroyed buildings, reinforced
concrete, and booby-trapping create significant technical
challenges on a daunting scale for mine clearance operators.
HALO has begun to adapt to meet these challenges by developing new survey techniques for urban areas. We are adapting
machines used for urban clearance in Afghanistan and other
contexts, and developing pilot projects in Afghanistan to trial
new techniques for clearance.
Neutral humanitarian space. The wars of the 21st century
are more likely to take place in urban populated areas, where
the lines between peace and formal war, and between civilian
and combatant are increasingly fluid. With numerous nonstate actors in communities, negotiating access becomes an
ongoing process rather than a precursor to engagement. HMA
operators must be flexible and nimble to be able to adapt, and
change areas of operation swiftly in line with changing conditions, while protecting the safety of staff and communities.
2. Transitioning from the British Army to an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), how did your past work
prepare you for The HALO Trust, what lessons learned have
been the most valuable for you?
During my time as a soldier I fought in Northern Ireland,
Iraq, and Afghanistan and served in many other places.

I began my service in Berlin, protecting it from the Soviets—
the war that, thankfully, never was.
I’ve learnt several lessons from that experience:
• First, the British Army of 1989 was geared for a conventional fight against the Warsaw Pact. Now it has changed
out of all recognition to deal with the much more complex threats of terrorism and cyber warfare, while still
being able to protect the UK against a resurgent Russia.
There are parallels with mine action, which still has a legacy threat to clear, but I don’t think the sector has dared
to change at the same pace, and it needs to catch up.
• Second, the British Army teaches leadership—I see a sector afflicted by management speak. I’d like to see more
leadership and a clearer sense of direction.
• And third, the British Army teaches Mission Command,
by which it means trusting those who can be trusted.
Mine action could usefully do the same.
3. During your career in the military, how do you feel explosive hazards clearance has evolved over the years?
War is, at its heart, an attempt to out-maneuver your enemy.
To achieve this, you need to move without friction, breaching
natural and man-made obstacles. Conversely, you must limit
your enemy’s capacity to maneuver by creating obstacles. In
the 1980s, clearing and laying landmines played a major part
in this, but as war became more three-dimensional, the use of
landmines became less relevant—helicopters, insurgents, and
cyber warriors aren’t very worried by landmines. Now it is the
IED that dominates and, along with the proliferation of small
arms, the mine action sector needs to reinvent itself to counter these two threats.
4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for HALO
and other HMA NGOs, and how well-prepared do you
think the wider HMA/CWD community is for the future?
We need to be better at forecasting and responding to the
world of 2049, not 1989. In my view, growing populations,
urbanization, competition for land, climate change, biodiversity, non-state conflict, and threats to the rules-based
international order will predominate. Mine action is good at
dealing with the world as it was in 1989 or in 1997 when the
Ottawa Treaty was signed, but that is not a recipe for future
success. We are in danger of entering our anecdotage, addicted to the good old days—it’s time to make space for younger,
fresher thinking.
While only 10 percent of countries are currently on track
to meet their completion deadlines, we are also presented
with a great opportunity to increase the completion rate and
make life better for 60 million people. With a bit of innovative
thinking and increased political engagement from donors and
affected countries mines could be eradicated.

As we approach completion of clearance in many countries around the world, the HMA community must be aware
of the consequences of our exit. As humanitarian organizations, we bear responsibility for the impact of our presence or
lack thereof on our staff and the communities where we work.
We must therefore pay careful attention to how we draw down
operations as we approach country completion or transfer
over to national authorities. It also means there is an opportunity to do this correctly. This means exploring partnerships
with other NGOs, which might be able to provide livelihood
supports or training. It also means ensuring that there is sufficient national capacity to deal with any residual contamination, which may be discovered in the future.
The HMA community faces a challenge that every humanitarian sector wishes to face. Within the next decade, we expect
that large-scale mine clearance operations will be reduced in
many countries, in all but a handful of countries such as those
in the Middle East.
The HMA community thus faces a dilemma and an opportunity. Should we pivot and expand the scope of our operations where we can bring value, or should we slowly reduce in
size as we accomplish our goal of a landmine free world? To
achieve your mission is the ultimate aim of every humanitarian organization. Nevertheless, to eclipse would do a disservice
to significant and transferable skills of the HMA sector and
deep knowledge of local needs and context. HALO’s mission
is to “protect lives and restore livelihoods for those threatened by conflict.” While the nature of the threat may change
as conflicts evolve, HALO’s mission will remain the same. We
believe our sector has value to add in supporting countries
post-conflict and therefore could successfully diversify into
areas beyond our traditional mine action and conventional
weapons work.
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event
has impacted you in your role as CEO the most? (This
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with,
challenge, etc.)
Last year, HALO suffered a mine accident in NagornoKarabakh that killed three, badly wounded one, and harmed
a fifth person. It reminded me of the extraordinary commitment that people in HALO and mine action more broadly
make to this wonderful humanitarian cause. We could not do
our work without them and I salute the sacrifice and endeavor
of the amazing men and women who, day after day, go out to
make the world a safer place.
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ARIANNA CALZA BINI

gender &
mine
action

Arianna Calza Bini was the Director of the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP)
from 2009 to 2019. She recently joined the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) as Head of Division, following the integration of GMAP into the GICHD
as a new division. Previously she worked as Programme Manager and Gender Advisor
at the EU Delegation to Brazil, Gender and Poverty Officer for UNDP in El Salvador; and
Junior Expert and Gender Focal Point at the EU Delegation to Central America in Costa
Rica. She holds a Masters of Philosophy in Development Studies from the Institute of
Development Studies, Sussex, United Kingdom, and an advanced university degree in
economics from the University of Rome, Italy.

1. In your opinion, what are the opportunities and challenges to ensure that conventional weapons destruction
(CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) are gender
and diversity-responsive (funding, strategic planning,
governance, development approaches, staffing, political
interference, networking of organizations within uncertain political and external environments, etc.); and how
can the international community address these?
In the ten years I have been involved in CWD and HMA, I
think the main challenges for gender and diversity to be taken
seriously have been
•

the lack of understanding of gender and diversity and
their relevance in the mine action context.

•

the lack of political will and commitment of management to mainstream gender and diversity in programs
and projects.

•

the limited capacity to mainstream gender and diversity
in certain contexts.

•

funding restrictions (for example, donor procedures not
allowing to pay for staff on maternity leave) and lack of

gender budgeting.
Since I started working with the GMAP in 2009, I have also
seen progress in all these areas, and there is increasing recognition in the sector of the importance of mainstreaming gender
and diversity in order to deliver more inclusive, effective, and
efficient activities.
It has become clear that one size does not fit all, and that
gender and diversity need to be considered in all aspects of
mine action, from strategic planning to recruitment policies
and practices, all the way to uniforms and personal protective equipment.
In my opinion there is currently tremendous momentum to
ensure that gender and diversity are systematically taken into
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account in CWD and HMA, and to realize the sector’s potential to contribute to gender equality, inclusion, and the empowerment of women and girls.
The Women, Peace and Security agenda and the Sustainable
Development Goals constitute an important international
framework for gender-responsive mine action. Most operators have realized the importance of gender and diversity for
their operations and have policies/strategies and good practices in place. While ensuring that interventions are gender and
diversity sensitive—i.e., take into account the different needs,
priorities, and capabilities of women, girls, boys, and men—is
currently considered to be the very minimum, many operators
are now also interested in the transformative impact that mine
action can have in promoting more gender equality and empowerment of women.
Several donors support and even require mine action interventions to be at a minimum gender sensitive, while some
go beyond and have feminist foreign and aid policy that require transformative actions. National mine action authorities are requesting support to develop their capacity on
gender and diversity and adopt strategies and standards that
reflect best practices.
The United Nations has a new mine action strategy with an
even stronger focus on gender and will soon launch revised
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes. The GICHD
has adopted a new strategy in which one of the four strategic
goals is “Gender equality and inclusion are achieved and women and girls are empowered.” GMAP was integrated into the
GICHD in March this year to translate this commitment into
tangible support and services for the CWD and HMA sector
and to enable a multiplier effect by mainstreaming gender and
diversity in all the knowledge generated and disseminated by
the GICHD.

2. How has your prior professional experience prepared
you for being Director of GMAP and what lessons learned
have been the most valuable for you?
Growing up in an Italian-Swedish family, I always had interest and curiosity for other cultures, different ideas, and
perspectives. I also never felt entirely part of just one culture,
as even at home there would always be differing opinions and
practices. As a girl and young woman growing up in Italy, I
experienced street harassment, sexual harassment, and sexism, and always felt very uncomfortable and upset about it. It
took me some time and studies to be able to articulate how
very wrong those “normalized” behaviors were and to react
to them.
Undoubtedly my upbringing influenced my study choices
towards international economics and development. During
my studies I was confronted with some of the deep inequalities and injustices of this world and the ones that came closer to my heart were the ones between the Global North and
the Global South (for lack of a better definition), and those
between men and women. I decided to pursue a career in
international cooperation and development and ended up
spending 10 years in the Latin American region working
for the European Union and United Nations Development
Programme with a strong focus on gender.
One of the first lessons I learned as a young professional and
as a woman was how to be heard and valued by colleagues, supervisors, and counterparts. Working in multicultural environments, I always tried to listen and show respect for other
people’s beliefs and opinions while promoting change. It was
important to learn how to balance openness and flexibility
with integrity, especially when promoting women’s rights and
gender equality.
Other important and useful lessons were how to engage
with diverse stakeholders towards a common goal, and how
bureaucracy and control are necessary but can be too heavy,
to the point they hinder the delivery of actual results.
Family reasons took me back to Europe and specifically
to Switzerland where, after having a daughter, I decided to
engage in the intersection between the humanitarian sector
and the promotion of gender equality. The Gender and Mine
Action Programme offered me the ideal opportunity to do
this and what was supposed to be a maternity cover of a few
months in 2009 ended up being a 10-year endeavor in the
HMA sector.
3. As a strong, female leader involved in the NGO sector,
what are the most significant barriers you have faced?
I feel very lucky and privileged as I have mostly been respected and valued in my professional career. It has not always been easy and smooth, but I have managed to develop

respectful, collaborative, and productive relationships with
colleagues, partners, and authorities throughout my life.
When I started with GMAP in 2009, coming from the
broader development sector, I was new to HMA and it took me
some time to really understand and familiarize myself with all
areas and technicalities of the sector, and to earn credibility.
I was confronted with a relatively small community that was
highly technical, male-dominated with a high proportion of
military or former military people, where everybody seemed
to know each other and many would make it clear that what
counted for them was the technical, specialized knowledge
and the ones holding it (themselves).
Working on what is sometimes described as the “soft” side
of mine action, which is actually the side that focuses on people, I noticed a quite remarkable difference between the way
colleagues from civil society and advocacy organizations (the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines and others) welcomed me, and the initial condescendence and in some cases reluctance of colleagues involved in the more operational
and technical side of mine action (mostly men) to engage with
GMAP and me personally. Gender was not really a topic most
of the sector valued or was even interested in at the time.
The representation of women in the sector has increased in
the last ten years, but not significantly. The fact that it still is
highly male-dominated means that I often find myself in situations where I am one of the few women present, advocating
for the need to ensure the participation and inclusion of women and other underrepresented groups in mine action programs and forums.
I also think that there still is a tendency to highlight women in mine action as exceptional, and while they might well be
great, doing so reinforces the view that they are an exception,
rather than fully belonging in the sector in their own right,
with their strengths and weaknesses.
4. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event
has impacted you in your role as Director the most? (This
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with,
challenge, etc.)
The one thing that has affected me the most is travelling to
mine-affected areas and meeting the people who suffer from
landmines and ERW contamination in their communities,
the women, girls, boys and men who are survivors and indirect victims of this awful and indiscriminate scourge. Seeing
their resilience and strength has been truly inspiring. At the
same time, realizing how vulnerable and helpless they can be
in certain situations is a constant motivation to work towards
improving victim assistance and reducing the risk from explosive ordnance in a gender and diversity inclusive and
equal manner.
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© Patrice Moullet

A MBASSADOR STEFANO TOSCANO
Ambassador Stefano Toscano has been the Director of the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) since January 2014, bringing extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy and human security affairs following a rich career with the Swiss Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. As diplomatic collaborator in Berne (1998–2002), Ambassador Toscano grew
familiar with the importance and potential of the humanitarian disarmament agenda and established close contacts with actors working on small arms issues. He participated in the discussions and work that led to the creation of the Small Arms Survey in 1999. As a Counselor at the
Swiss Mission to the United Nations in New York (2002–2006), he was in charge of humanitarian, environmental, and migration affairs before serving as Vice Chairman of the 2nd Committee
of the U.N. General Assembly. After returning to Switzerland in 2006, Mr. Toscano was Head
of Section, Humanitarian Policy and Migration, at the Human Security Division of the Political
Directorate, then Deputy Head of Division. In the-three-and-a-half years before joining the GICHD, he was the Deputy Chief of
Mission at the Swiss Embassy in Cairo. Ambassador Toscano holds a Ph.D. in natural science from the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of San Diego.

1. In your opinion, what are the main humanitarian mine action (HMA) and conventional weapons destruction (CWD)
obstacles faced by organizations working in HMA, specifically the GICHD?
Strong national commitment, a solid implementation architecture
coupled to efficient operations, and international solidarity remain
the three key factors of successful mine action work at a national level.
Experience shows that, once in place, these factors go a long way in ensuring the timely fulfillment of treaty obligations and the attainment
of national completion targets. In some parts of the world, however, we
are witnessing a changing working environment. Mine action actors are
called upon to work closer to conflicts due to their prolonged nature and
pressing humanitarian needs, including in relation to the return home
of displaced persons. These conflicts represent complex operational contexts by virtue of their urban nature, the multiplicity of actors and risks,
and the unprecedented large-scale use of improvised explosive devices (IED), which often function like mines. Mine action actors wishing
to operate there face challenges pertaining to the necessary operational
space and the technical complexity of improvised devices.
On the former issue, a reflection in the sector is on-going regarding the when and how to negotiate humanitarian access. Institutional
mandates entrusted to regional or international organizations can
sometimes offer entry points in that regard, as exemplified by the framework provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine. On the latter, the current revision of the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) is paramount and will
provide much needed guidance on the search and disposal of IEDs in
urban settings.
Turmoil and conflict have also affected the functioning of national
mine action programs. In some instances, national capacities are yet to
be built. This is a significant challenge, not least for the GICHD, which
usually works with established national institutions. The mine action
sector has been very innovative in supporting local partners in difficult
circumstances, such as through remote training.
With respect to the need for a solid implementation architecture
and efficient operations, let me emphasize the key role of international and national standards in accelerating treaty implementation. The
IMAS play a decisive role in turning the obligations enshrined in the
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conventions into reality in the field—as proven again and again in the
20 years since their establishment. It will be important to continue to
make sure that they remain in sync with operational realities in the field.
Finally, on international solidarity: the 2025 and 2030 aspirational goals agreed upon at Maputo (3rd Review Conference (RC) of the
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)) in 2014 and Geneva
(6th Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM)) in 2016, respectively, were important levers to renew the cooperation between affected States, donor States, and other stakeholders. Yet, international funding remains under strain, particularly with
regard to so-called legacy contamination. The upcoming 4th RC of the
APMBC (Oslo, November 2019) is a welcome opportunity to reaffirm
once again our commitment to achieving mine-free status in all affected
countries around the world within the next few years and to emphasize
the essential enabling role mine action plays with respect to humanitarian action, peace and security, and sustainable development. Reaffirming
that mine action is more than mine action and showcasing what that
means concretely will help, I am convinced, to re-energize and broaden
its support base.
You will agree that the three factors of success mentioned earlier are
as much important to mine action as they are to ammunition management. During many years, much of our focus in ammunition management used to be on short-term interventions and physical improvements
of ammunition storage sites. This approach can prevent a disaster but
has been challenged by the observed lack of lasting change in the capacities of and commitment by national partners. In response, international partners have started to adopt a comprehensive and gradual
approach to institutional, legislative, and operational changes in ammunition management practices. In parallel, a strengthened application
of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) is being pursued. Encouragingly, cooperation and funding for ammunition
management have gone up significantly in recent times.
2. How have your roles as an ambassador and a diplomat prepared
you for being Director of the GICHD, and what lessons learned
have been the most valuable for you?
Well, I do not know that my diplomatic career so far was necessarily meant to prepare me for my current position. But more seriously, it
definitely strengthened my personal interest in all things humanitarian

and disarmament, including the correlation between the two, enhanced
my savoir faire with respect to multilateral diplomacy, and showed me
first hand, in the frame of the small arms/light weapons (SA/LW) process leading to the UN SA/LW Conference in 2001 that negotiated the
Program of Action to Combat Illicit Trafficking in SA/LW, how multistakeholder approaches can make a real difference both at the normative and field levels. All this is fully relevant to my current position as
Director of a Centre dedicated to mine action and ammunition management from a humanitarian perspective and at both multilateral and
field levels.
As a diplomat, I often tried and worked based on the belief that the
combination of innovative ideas, strong partnerships, and some money can go a surprisingly long way to address apparently intractable issues. That belief is also guiding me in my current position, as we at the
GICHD work with our partners to promote the sector-wide development and application of innovative concepts, methods and tools, for
example in the field of information management.
3. How do you feel the field of HMA has evolved since you became
director?
The field of mine action has evolved significantly in recent years.
First of all, the wide recognition and year-long application of the
land-release approach has transformed the underpinning narrative
in mine action into one aimed at a progressive, evidence-based reduction of risks. This represents a fundamental “cultural” change towards
a risk-reduction approach, a change that is fully reflected in the new
strategy of the GICHD.
A risk-reduction approach goes hand in hand with an increased acknowledgement of the need timely to plan for the long-term management of residual risks—that is of those risks that we anticipate might
still exist, but for which no evidence has emerged yet. We have witnessed important developments in this regard recently, especially in Southeast Asia. Several mine action strategies, for instance of
Cambodia and Sri Lanka, now explicitly recognize such timely planning as a priority, and concrete action is taking place—the establishment of adequate legal, institutional, and operational frameworks in
Vietnam being a case in point.
Noteworthy is also that mine action is, more than ever, understood
as an enabler of broader agendas. The Sustainable Development Goals
narrative to “go more connected” has certainly paved the way for that,
whilst Colombia illustrated recently the positive contribution that
mine action can make to peace processes. We now realize fully that being part of larger agendas is key for the sustainability and impact of our
work and for others to benefit from what we have to offer.
Finally, I would mention the stronger orientation on results. As a
sector, we now seek to achieve and demonstrate lasting change for what
we do in terms of improved lives and livelihoods. This also responds
to the wish of many mine action stakeholders for more accountability
and transparency. In this same spirit, we have moved into a culture of
“learning and adapting,” whereby we monitor, evaluate, and adapt our
approaches constantly.

4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for the
GICHD to help the wider HMA/CWD community moving into
the future?
In the development of our new strategy 2019–2022, we assessed

Building on our 20-year experience in support of mine action, we believe we are well placed to promote an approach that aims to reduce
risks more broadly. This is why our underlying narrative has changed
from humanitarian demining to the broader reduction of risks from
explosive ordnance.
A significant element of it will be to help fill gaps in the safe and secure management of ammunition. Our experience in IMAS development, outreach, and implementation will be put to good use towards a
strengthened application of the IATG. The Ammunition Management
Advisory Team, newly established within the GICHD together with the
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, will be a key resource to that effect.
In light of the remaining and new contamination, the need for efficient and effective mine action is undiminished. The GICHD’s core task
to help develop and support nationally-owned, sustainable capacities
remains in high demand and will continue to represent a key contribution of ours in the coming years. That said, we aim to enhance the sustainability of our support through an increased country focus.
I also see a continued role for the GICHD to help adapt the sector’s
concepts, methods, tools, and standards to the new realities in the field.
Think about operating in urban settings or dealing with more complex
improvised devices. It is in the GICHD’s DNA to provide guidance
on such pressing issues. At the same time, we will also lead on making established mine action concepts, methods, and tools useful for
broader undertakings. The development of the Enterprise Geographic
Information System (EGIS) for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
(SMM) to Ukraine is a case in point. Fact-finding and reporting belong
to the SMM’s tasks. The EGIS will facilitate this by using state-of-the
art reporting and mapping tools—well known in the mine actor sector—to improve the flow of information between SMM’s field teams
and its headquarters.
Furthermore, we see an increasing need for platforms for dialogue
and cooperation, for example in support of the country-focused approaches currently fostered under the APMBC and CCM. Regional and
bilateral exchanges among affected countries also still yield untapped
potential. This is a role that we are committed to offering for the benefit of our partners.
Finally, through the recent integration of the Gender and Mine
Action Programme into the GICHD, we will be able to multiply our efforts to turn the gender and diversity agenda into a reality in the field.
Working to see more women in mine action, involved in building solutions, and to help talented women and youth with diverse backgrounds
grow in their careers, will be part of it.
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event has impacted you in your role as Director the most?
My first mission as Director of the GICHD, two months into the job,
was to Cambodia, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. What I saw there—the impact landmines and cluster munitions have had and were still having
on the lives of so many people, the dedication of the mine action community to address these challenges professionally and speedily, and the
positive role the GICHD was playing in supporting these efforts—all
this is still with me today and represents a formidable source of motivation. What I also appreciate much is the common sense of purpose,
collaboration, and solidarity that characterizes the mine action sector—sort of a victory of cooperation over competition for the benefit of
a good cause. This is far from obvious and very inspiring.

extensively how the GICHD can best serve its partners in the future.
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ALLAN VOSBURGH
Allan Vosburgh is the Chief Executive Officer of the Golden West Humanitarian
Foundation since 2016. Vosburgh is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and former U.S. Army
Master Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician with over 40 years of experience in munitions stockpile management, explosive safety, EOD, munitions testing,
weapons of mass destruction, training, technology assessments, and humanitarian
mine action (HMA). Before retiring from the Army in 2005, Vosburgh served in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict) in the Pentagon, where he provided oversight of EOD, HMA technology, and
Special Operations Ammunition. Other assignments included Ammunition Officer for
the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations/G-3, Commander, 3rd Ordnance Battalion
(EOD), and Director of (Ammunition) Materiel Testing at Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana. He served as a Department
of Army Civilian from 2009 to 2016 as U.S. Army, Pacific, G-4, Chief of Munitions. Vosburgh holds Master of Science degrees from both the National Defense University and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He worked as a volunteer with
Golden West from 2006 to 2016.
1. In your opinion, what are the main conventional weapons
destruction (CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA)
obstacles faced by non-governmental organizations
(NGO) operating in the Pacific (funding, strategic planning,
governance, development approaches, staffing, political
interference, networking of organizations within uncertain political and external environments, etc.); how are
they typically overcome?
The Pacific encompasses a vast amount of area and a number
of diverse HMA challenges. Golden West operations currently engages the Solomon Islands, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, all with very different needs
and challenges. Funding is always a challenge and government
donors are subject to short-term budgets in the face of longterm requirements and commitments needed to build capacity to overcome HMA challenges. Donor fatigue is a reality and
can have substantial impacts to organizational strategic planning, especially when you must rely on limited donors.
Golden West is different from many other Pacific HMA
NGOs, who focus on clearance of landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO). Golden West does not generally conduct clearances, but concentrates on technology and training
that builds long-term capacity. Golden West operates the
Explosive Harvesting Program, funded by the Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department
of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA),
and in partnership with Cambodia’s Mine Action Center
(CMAC), recycling suitable munitions and creating explosive
charges used by all clearance NGOs in Cambodia to destroy
landmines and UXO.
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The extended nature of Golden West training engagements
requires cooperation from national authorities and recognition of the value added by the capacity we provide. Asian cultural values are often at odds to a quick approach, and it can
take many years to gain trust and willing support.
The customers are also very different, and these differences have serious implications for how HMA programs evolve.
In the Solomon Islands, we provide International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) EOD training for the Royal Solomon
Islands Police Force. Their EOD teams are now well trained
and have the skills and capacity to sustain a safe and effective
program, but working in the Solomon Islands is difficult. The
remote nature of the islands, the physical conditions of heat,
rain, mud, and tropical jungles, helps make it a challenge just
to work there.
In Vietnam, we work primarily with Vietnamese Provincial
Military Commands (PMC), building EOD skills supporting both emergency responses and battle area clearances.
Golden West’s PMC IMAS EOD training is focused on building long-term, sustainable capabilities that can take over when
proactive clearance is done and Vietnam assumes all explosive remnants of war (ERW) missions. We are now focused on
making the PMCs capable of safely and effectively managing
the inevitable residual UXO without assistance.
2. Transitioning from the U.S. Army to an NGO, how did your
past work prepare you for Golden West, and what lessons learned have been the most valuable for you?
Many years of military service provided a solid technical background in ammunition management and EOD.
When assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), I
worked closely with Department of Defense Humanitarian
Demining Research and Development Program (HD R&D)
at Fort Belvoir, VA. There I had the opportunity to interact
with a wide variety of HMA NGOs and programs. The excellent work that HD R&D does within the HMA sector was a
great introduction to different organizations and different approaches to the work we do. After retiring from the Army, I
volunteered with Golden West for 10 years and got the chance
to really know the organization before taking on the job of
CEO. In terms of lessons learned, NGOs aren’t so different
from military organizations I served or commanded over the
years. You try to find the best people you can, provide them
the resources they need, provide them clear guidance, and
then get out of their way and let them do the job.
3. During your past 13 years with Golden West, how do you
feel explosive hazards clearance has evolved since you
became a civilian?
Mine action’s strategic environment continues to shift and
evolve. Since 2005, when donors primarily focused on landmine clearance issues, we have seen growth of concerns regarding cluster munitions and a growing interest in physical
security and stockpile management. The days when the large
foreign mine action groups had plenty of funded work in
clearing mines are largely ending and diversity of missions
within the sector have become much more competitive. I am
a bit disappointed that more American NGOs have not been
created to support HMA. The United States is by far the biggest donor to worldwide ERW operations, yet the sector continues to be dominated by foreign HMA organizations.
In many areas, we are finally to a point where attention is
shifting from proactive to reactive responses, and to examination of methods to manage residual ERW. This requires
more attention to building real capacity in national programs
now dominated by international NGOs, and preparing national programs to assume unilateral responsibility for HMA.
4. Going forward, what opportunities do you see for Golden
West and other HMA NGOs, and how well-prepared do
you think the community is for the future?
Sadly, wars continue to add ERW around the world, so I
doubt there will be any shortage of opportunities for the sector in the foreseeable future. The challenge will continue to be
finding adequate funding, and finding highly qualified people
who want to do HMA NGO work. My concern is that a generation of military EOD operators have been forced to focus on
the improvised explosive device-fight at the cost of detailed
technical knowledge of ammunition and explosives. The sector badly needs EOD and ammunition experts with more
than a superficial knowledge of munitions, who can also be
diplomats, often working independently to train and mentor

technicians and to advise host nation technical and government agencies.
5. While working in HMA, what experience, lesson, or event
has impacted you in your role as CEO the most? (This
could be a travel experience, people met/worked with,
challenge, etc.)
I first met Senior Colonel Nguyen Quang Bieu, from the
People’s Army of Vietnam when he attended an HD R&D
HMA Workshop in 2003. At that time, he was assigned to
the External Relations Department (ERD) of the Vietnamese
Ministry of National Defense. Over the course of that week,
we had the opportunity to talk and learned that we had served
our respective countries in roughly the same places during
1971–1972. That war was in the distant past, but Bieu was the
first former adversary with whom I was comfortable discussing it. I invited them to my home where my wife, Be, cooked
Vietnamese food for all of us. Bieu and I became fast friends
and we did our best to continue to keep up our discussion.
Sometime after I retired from the U.S. Army and joined
Golden West, I learned that Bieu was also retiring from the
Army of Vietnam. At the time, we were struggling to establish
an HMA program in Vietnam and having little luck soliciting
support from the ERD or other Vietnamese agencies. I suggested he might consider coming to work with Golden West.
Bieu became Golden West’s Vietnam Country Representative and soon was the key to gaining access in Vietnam. We
worked together for 10 years, and he never failed to provide
good counsel, even in the face of unremitting frustration. He
helped guide the organization through a series of growing
pains and helped me understand how to negotiate the intricacies of Vietnamese bureaucracy.
Most of all, he helped me learn that former enemies can truly be friends. His essential humanity impressed and gave me
hope that all the other wars since have the potential for some
sort of reconciliation. Bieu suddenly passed away in early
February 2019 and was honored as a hero of Vietnam during
a formal state funeral. He was my personal hero, because despite fighting serious illness, he stayed active in Golden West
and our programs to aid Vietnam’s recovery from ERW. His
passing was not just a loss to Golden West but to the entire
HMA sector.
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DR. JANE COCKING, OBE
Dr. Jane Cocking joined MAG (Mines Advisory Group) as chief executive in
January 2017. She has more than 25 years’ experience in the humanitarian sector and has led response to multiple crises across the world, from Somalia to
Syria. Cocking has also been involved in many strategic initiatives to improve the
quality of humanitarian response. She worked for the ODA (the Department for
International Development’s predecessor) and Save the Children before spending
almost 20 years with Oxfam GB, eight as Humanitarian Director.

1. In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the
conventional weapons destruction (CWD) and humanitarian mine action (HMA) community today? How can the international community address there?
We have clear goals and the skills to free millions across the
world from the fear of landmines and bombs; we have strong
political backing from many places and great donors but this
support needs to be expanded. The main challenge our community faces is universal political will.
Funding continues to be an issue for the sector as a whole,
in many areas the amounts we need are, in global budgetary
terms, not huge. More political will from some actors to contribute creatively to this financial need would go a long way.
Stronger collaboration with and support for governments in
affected states to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities
would make our sector more cost effective and sustainable and
must be delivered.
2. How has your prior experience in the humanitarian sector prepared you for being CEO of MAG? What lessons
have been the most valuable for you?
I have learnt that if you stick to your principles and have
high technical standards, then you’ll achieve the best you can.
Nearly 30 years in the humanitarian sector have given me extensive experience of solving complex problems in environments, which are physically and politically extremely difficult.
The people who work in the humanitarian, CWD, and HMA
sectors are very motivated and committed and they need the
same thing—to have the right skills and support at the right
time. Oh, and a sense of humour and humility go a long way!
3. Going forward what opportunities do you see for MAG
and other HMA nongovernmental organizations (NGO)
and how well prepared do you think the community is for
the future?
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The biggest opportunity is for HMA NGOs to be a key part
of delivering a mine free world—this is a rare chance for the
international community to show that when it makes a commitment, as it did over 20 years ago in the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention, that it delivers on that promise.
Beyond this, the skills and knowledge that we have are
unique in the NGO world and we must apply them to other
problems which threaten people’s safety and their futures—
for example the management and destruction of small arms
and light weapons and ammunition—we just need to be
clearer and more creative about how we use this knowledge
and skills.
4. As a strong, female leader involved in the NGO sector, what has been the most significant barrier of your
career?
The biggest barrier is always if you don’t believe you can
do something. Once you’re over that and you believe you can,
then there is always a way to do anything so long as your heart
is in the right place. It’s a real joy to see younger women clearing this hurdle with ease!
5. While working in HMA, what experience or lesson or
event has impacted you in your role as CEO the most?
Every time I travel to a MAG program, I talk to ordinary
people in the communities where we work, and there is always
someone who says or does something that reminds me of why
we’re there, and it sticks in my mind. When the day-to-day
business is complicated and difficult, then remember that one
person and do the right thing by them.

UKRAINE’s
Newly Adopted Mine Action Law:

What Does This Mean
for MA Programs?
by Henrique Garbino [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ]

L

andmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are estimated to affect the lives of two million people in eastern
Ukraine, restricting freedom of movement and access to
key infrastructure and livelihoods.1 Estimates on casualties vary widely and are often inconsistent. Nevertheless, estimates
range between 1,600 and 3,600 military personnel and civilians who
have fallen victim to mines and ERW since 2014.2
Recent contamination in the region is the result of the ongoing
conflict between Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. 3 Although the full extent
of contamination is unknown, conservative estimates suggest that
about 20 sq km (7.72 sq mi) are contaminated.4
Currently, at least three government institutions are directly involved with humanitarian demining, with the support of three international NGOs. 5 Many more organizations are involved in mine risk
education (MRE), victim assistance, stockpile destruction, advocacy
and training, advisory, and coordination of the mine action program.
However, until January 2019, there was no strong legal framework
to orchestrate these efforts. 3 This article describes the current legal
framework for mine action in Ukraine, analyzes the legislative process and bureaucratic impediments, and briefly discusses the different prospects of the newly-adopted mine action law.

Legislative Process

Representatives of mine action stakeholders in Ukraine agree
that the obstacles to passing national legislation were not technical. Throughout the years, the mine action community has consolidated lessons learned and developed best practices for developing
national mine action laws.7–9 Moreover, international organizations
have provided direct support to the Ukrainian government in helping to overcome any technical obstacles.10 Yet, a specific legislation
on mine action was approved only recently by the Ukrainian government. On 6 November 2018, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament)
of Ukraine conducted the first reading of draft law No. 9080-1.11
However, it was returned for further amendments, and international organizations were asked to present their thoughts and suggestions.12 The second reading of the bill took place exactly one month
later, and the legislation was approved on 6 December 2018.13 The

draft law was then forwarded to the Cabinet of Ministers, which approved the legislation on 25 January 2019.
Instead of technical issues, the main challenges seemed to be of
a political nature, as the very exercise of passing a law is a strenuous and time-consuming process. Moreover, the ongoing conflict
has taken up most of the political attention and resources. Parallel
to the conflict, the 2014 revolution triggered a series of reforms that
are still taking place and most likely will continue to require political attention.14 The new mine action legislation will inevitably lead to
another reform, which would affect roles, responsibilities, and budgeting among government authorities. Needless to say, such changes
are likely to prompt internal friction and disagreement.14 In addition, private interests pushed forward by commercial companies led
to considerable disagreements over the framework of the future mine
action legislation during negotiations.15 Despite lengthy discussions,
former inaction, and other delays in the adoption of a mine action
law, government authorities slowly came to an agreement of their
shared roles and responsibilities.16

Mine Action in Ukraine

The new law “On mine action in Ukraine” lays the legal and organizational groundwork for conducting mine action in Ukraine and also
highlights the peculiarities of exercising state regulation in this area.18
The law defines “the legal ground, objectives and principles, national interests of Ukraine in the mine action ambit, a list of the mine
action objects and entities, the procedure of their creation together
with organizational and procedural principles of operation; requirements to mine action and demining specialists and their responsibilities; mine action sources of financing; the registration procedure for
mine action operators, rendering assistance to blast victims, framing the status of territories intended for mine action purposes, etc.”13
Importantly, the law calls for a civilian-led mine action center, in
order to “[provide] for regulations that govern democratic civic control in the field of mine action, the national interests of Ukraine in the
field of mine action, the principles of international cooperation and
implementation of economic activities in the field of mine action, including liability insurance during mine clearance and public procurement in the field of mine action.” The law also establishes the grounds
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Figure 1. Mine and ERW casualties in eastern Ukraine. 6
Figure courtesy of The HALO Trust.

for procuring contracts for mine action services and provides liability for violating the mine action legislation.13
The new legislation is to be implemented by mid-2019, including the establishment of both the National Mine Action Authority

Prior to the conflict, a presidential decree established a National

and Mine Action Center.12 It provides the necessary legal framework

Mine Action Authority (NMAA) in Ukraine on September 2013. The

and institutional structure to advance the mine action program in

Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Department of Environmental Safety

Ukraine. However, because the law was passed after the 2019 budget

and Mine Action was tasked to coordinate the in-country mine ac-

had been approved, there is no dedicated government budget for its

tion program, acting as the secretariat for the NMAA.3 At that time,

implementation. Therefore, it is still uncertain how and when the

the focus was on the destruction of stockpiles and legacy ERW from

law will be implemented.

World War I and II.20

19
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Before and After the Mine
Action Legislation
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National roundtable on national mine action standards in Kiev, 14 June 2018. 22

Image courtesy of Miljenko Vahtaric, Technical Adviser on Humanitarian Mine Action, OSCE.

After the conflict erupted in 2014, the scope of the problem
increased substantially, and many other actors joined the demining
effort, including different government bodies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. Although the MOD remained
the de facto coordinating body for humanitarian demining, it did not
have the required authority over other ministries and government
institutions currently involved in mine action. The coordination of
MRE activities, for example, was mostly undertaken by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP)-led mine action subcluster,
but not without flaws.21 There was sometimes poor or no coordination
among partners performing MRE, with a high risk of leaving gaps in
some areas and duplication of efforts in others.21 Likewise, local civil
authorities in mine-affected communities did not seem to be informed
about the scope of the problem and the location of hazardous areas
in their region, let alone the current demining plans and activities.22
According to the mine action legislation passed in late January 2019,
the new National Mine Action Authority should be “a permanent interdepartmental collegial authority, set by the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine.”18 This structure should allow for better coordination
among the different governmental authorities currently involved in
mine action, although the challenge of ensuring local-level mine risk
awareness and program support remains.
While Ukraine’s MOD is understandably mostly preoccupied with the
ongoing conflict, it will remain the responsible authority for the prioritization of clearance tasks until the establishment of the National Mine
Action Center by 25 April 2019. However, while immediate emergency
and short-term security needs are a logical priority from a defense and
security perspective, this might at times be contrary to long-term socioeconomic perspectives and humanitarian objectives. For example, certain existing minefields might be regarded by the military as a necessary
defensive obstacle and not be prioritized for clearance, even though it affects a large number of civilians.

In the absence of national standards, Ukraine adopted the
International Mine Action Standards in September 2016 as a provisory measure until National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) were
approved. 3 With the support of international actors, the MOD has
drafted different NMAS since 2016. However, even though most mine
action operators had agreed to follow them, the standards were not
binding without national legislation to enforce them.23 The MOD finalized the NMAS in late 2018 and, with the endorsement of the newlypassed national mine action legislation, expects to fully implement
them by the end of 2019.18,24
However, as one of the consequences of the delayed legislation,
there have been inconsistencies throughout the mine action program
in Ukraine. First, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories
and Internally Displaced Persons, for example, had developed its own
standards for MRE, which then competed with the MOD’s. Second,
information management has been subject to duplication of efforts
and discrepancies. At least two main mine action datasets are currently in place, one managed by the MOD and another by the State
Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU). There has been no clear division of responsibilities for data collection, especially for mine and
ERW casualties, perhaps explaining the inconsistency and probable
underreporting seen in this area.16,25 Moreover, the standards used
for data entry differ from common international practice, leading to
grossly overestimated figures for clearance activities.26 The new legislation attempts to tackle those issues by abiding to the Information
Management System for Mine Action and centralizing information
under the National Mine Action Center.18
Unfortunately, compulsory accreditation and quality management
processes were only recently established by the new mine action law.18
Humanitarian demining organizations have operated under individual memorandums of understanding with the MOD and are tasked
by its Coordinating Group for Mine Action. Clearance procedures
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were not externally verified before, during, or after execution and
cleared land could not be officially released for use by the population.
In the end of September 2018, the Ministry of Defense started its own
accreditation process, but like the NMAS, they are only enforceable if
backed up by the national legislation.24 The current legal framework
establishes an Accreditation and Monitoring Commission, but that is

of parliament Ivan Vinnyk proposed the Ukrainian Parliament vote
in the plenary session on whether to direct donor funding of mine action, but the vote did not pass, and the question remains unanswered.
Although the law is still valid, humanitarian mine action funding is
at risk and is already impacting donor funding decisions relating to
the future of continued mine action operations in Ukraine. 31

yet to be implemented.18
Until the NMAA is established, stakeholders need to deal with
multiple interlocutors and risk miscommunication. A European
Union (EU)-funded project in support of the State Special Transport
Service’s demining teams had to be closed after it was transferred
from the auspices of the Ministry of Infrastructure to the MOD, because the EU could not support the Ukrainian military due to their
funding policies.27 Some argue that the lack of a specific legal framework caused concern and mistrust among prospective donors, thus
limiting the availability of international funding.10,28 In order to address these concerns, the newly established NMAA will be responsible to act in the name of the state when dealing with international
organizations within the sphere of mine action.18
An additional flaw was that the previous legal framework for
mine action did not cover specific compensations and assistance
for mine victims, deminers, and citizens who lost access to their
livelihoods due to mine and ERW contamination. In fact, Ukrainian
law only now distinguishes mine victims from other conflict-related
victims.18,24 Even though the new legislation accounts for medical
and socio-psychological support for victims of explosive ordnance,
it only grants a one-time monetary compensation for persons under
18 years old.19 Moreover, it does not address many of the legal
disputes that may arise in terms of land rights and compensation for
lost livelihoods.18
Finally, the absence of specific procurement provisions—an issue
not addressed by the new legislation—has hindered import and usage of dual-use equipment and vehicles, such as mine detectors, armored vehicles, and explosives. International operators face a series
of bureaucratic impediments to import dual-use material and until

Conclusion

Until January 2019, Ukraine did not have a national mine action legislation. However, the lack of specific legislation was not an
insurmountable challenge for humanitarian demining and related activities. While important for addressing practical issues, such
legislation is a crucial step toward ownership, and is an opportunity for a fresh start, to rectify working relationships, and adopt new
procedures and higher-quality standards.13
Moreover, the new law is necessary to unleash the full potential
of mine action in Ukraine by de-conflicting competing efforts and
facilitating bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, the new mine action law shows Ukraine’s commitment to addressing the problem of
contamination by mines and ERW and may enhance donor trust in
funding a national program.14 Nevertheless, while the newly adopted
legislation has clarified many inconsistencies of the Ukrainian mine
action program, it has also shown significant gaps and created further
uncertainty, especially in relation to direct donor funding and government budget for its implementation.19
Finally, while the new legislation is important now, it will be much
more so when the conflict calms down. As the conflict in eastern
Ukraine decreases in intensity and full clearance starts in the buffer
zone, the number of operators and donors will likely increase, as will
the need for better coordination and resource management. 32 For
now, with the support of international organizations, Ukrainian authorities bear the greatest responsibilities in implementing the mine
action legislation.
See endnotes page 69

this day are not authorized to dispose of the mines and ERW found
during clearance operations.16 Instead, the MOD or SESU explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are required to dispose of items. This
current practice puts an unnecessary burden on EOD units, slows
down clearance operations, and leaves mines and ERW exposed for
longer periods of time, increasing the risk of accidents and criminal
use of the ordnance.23
Despite the general excitement with which the mine action community received the newly adopted legislation, the law has raised serious
concerns especially among donors. Article 8 states that “donorsponsored financial resources are credited to a special fund of the
state budget under the relevant budget programs.”24 In other words,
donor funding should be pooled and managed by a government organization, and not directly by the implementing partners. While
this provision was supported by representatives of the defense and
security industry, it is unacceptable for most donors and could result in a large decrease, if not cessation, of funds from international donors.29,30 Nonetheless, Articles 20 and 28 assign the Ukrainian
Cabinet of Ministers the responsibility to regulate mine action operators who are directly funded by donors. This raises the question of the
legality of direct donor funding.19 The issue was raised, and member
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Henrique Garbino served in the Brazilian
Army from 2006 to 2017 as a combat
engineer officer and an EOD specialist. He is currently a master’s student at
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Rotary Peace Fellowship, he was posted
for three months to FSD programs in Tajikistan and Ukraine.

The Challenges of
Humanitarian Mine Clearance
in
by Toby Robinson and Rosanna O’Keeffe [ The HALO Trust ]

T

he HALO Trust (HALO) has been working in Ukraine since
2015, a year after the hostilities in the east of the country

began. Both the ongoing conflict in the Donbas and tensions on the border with Russia have left large areas of land
contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war
(ERW). In places where the frontline has moved on and the fighting
has stopped, mines and other ERW remain, preventing the lives of civilians from returning to normal.
HALO currently has around 400 full-time staff employed in
Ukraine and is conducting manual and mechanical clearance, nontechnical and technical survey, risk education, and some capacity
building with state authorities to enhance their capabilities to carry out humanitarian survey and data gathering. HALO’s program in
Ukraine is currently funded by the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, and has
received funding in the past from Switzerland, the Czech Republic,
and the European Union.

Image 1. Items found on HALO tasks. A TM-62 anti-vehicle
mine with fuze visible on the surface and side exposed
through excavation.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.

As in every part of the world, Ukraine has its own set of challenges that affect humanitarian mine clearance. The key challenges
facing humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine relate to the main
threat types encountered: tripwire-initiated devices and both metaland minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines. There are additional challenges relating to the specifics of the Ukrainian context: demining in
an active conflict zone, working without explosives, and the extreme
weather conditions. New techniques and technology, some tried and
tested in other countries, are being explored. These are too numerous to list; however, we will discuss a few of the key ways HALO is
overcoming some of the challenges of conducting humanitarian mine
clearance in Ukraine.

Context
The two regions of Donetsk and Luhansk are currently in a de facto
state of division between the territory controlled by the government

Image 2: A RDG-5 hand grenade with a nylon tripwire.
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Figure 1. Maps showing the major movements of the non-government controlled areas from May 2014 to
March 2016 when the line of contact became more static.
of Ukraine and separatist non-government controlled areas (NGCA).
The terms of the Minsk ceasefire agreement created a 15 km (9.3 mi)
buffer zone on either side of the line of contact between the two opposing forces and forbade the stationing of heavy weaponry within
the zone. Despite the agreement, shelling and crossfire between both
sides occurs on an almost daily basis.
Land inside the buffer zone and on the line of contact is heavily
contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
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While the location of the line of contact now remains largely static,
in 2014 and 2015 it was far more f luid with large areas of territory
regularly changing hands during the fighting. This has resulted in
widespread mine and UXO contamination, not just along the current line of contact but also within and outside of the buffer zone.
Additionally, civilians continue to live in areas where neither side
has full control, commonly referred to as the grey zone. Here the
threat from landmines and UXO is also prevalent.

Ukraine is a Party to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and in 2018
received approval of its request to extend its
deadline to 1 June 2021 to clear its territory of all known anti-personnel minefields.
However, the extension request stated that
achieving these obligations was dependent
on “…completion of hostilities, restoration
of the constitutional order and gaining the
full control over the occupied territories,
including over the state border between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”1
Currently HALO is only able to work
in areas controlled by the government of
Ukraine and is working across both oblasts
inside and outside the buffer zone. HALO
is unable to work on the line of contact or
the grey zone but teams are working to survey and clear areas close by where the threat
of mines and UXO is affecting the civilian
population. Therefore the challenges outlined only refer to the areas within eastern
Ukraine where HALO works. They do not refer to the nature of the mine and ERW problem in areas of Ukraine where HALO is not
working: the grey zone, the line of contact
itself, and the NGCAs, which may differ in
terms of threat type.

Ukraine-Specific
Challenges

Operating in conflict-affected regions.

While the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine
has decreased since the heavy fighting of 2014,
indirect fire and shooting close to the line of

Figure 2. Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions showing HALO’s current area of operations.

contact remains a reality. HALO does not

lar areas is required before demining teams deploy close to the line of

of UXO, the SES is contacted and their assistance is requested.
Although this generally works well, the situation in Ukraine means
that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity of the SES is
often over-stretched. In some cases the lead time between the discovery of an item and its removal can be a number of days. In cases
where the device poses a particular danger such as where a tripwireinitiated device is discovered, deminers have to be moved a safe
distance away to work elsewhere on the minefield. Where there is a
significant delay in a device’s destruction or removal the clearance

contact. If shelling occurs nearby or there has been a major escalation

strategy of the minefield can be disrupted.

work in areas where there is a threat of mines being relaid. However,
the buffer zone contains the most areas with mine contamination, and
this means there is a need to work in some areas that are only a few
kilometers from the line of contact. Although civilians and NGOs are
not deliberately targeted, working in such close proximity to the line
of contact does present a risk to demining teams from stray indirect
fire. Careful consideration of the security situation in those particu-

close to the minefield, work is suspended and teams moved in order
to guarantee the security of demining staff. HALO does not deploy
teams in those areas where there is a high threat of indirect fire or close
to active military positions; however, there are inevitably times when
demining teams within the buffer zone have to suspend work and are
moved as a safety precaution.
Destruction of items. Humanitarian demining operators do not
yet have access to explosives in Ukraine, nor permission to carry out
render-safe procedures. This hinders the work but is not an insurmountable problem. Rather than conducting demolitions, the destruction or removal of ERW requires close coordination with the
State Emergency Service (SES). When HALO finds a mine or item

Challenges in the Minefields

Non-technical and technical survey. The nature of mine clearance is that the majority of the time the mines remaining in a contaminated area are buried or concealed. Therefore in order to avoid
clearing land unnecessarily non-technical and technical survey
methods are used. Where minelaying has been conducted in a uniform pattern, technical survey methods can be useful. Technical
survey involves conducting limited clearance to find exactly where
a mine-line is, enabling the follow-up clearance of the minefield to
be more targeted and avoiding the need to clear areas far from the
identified pattern.
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Figure 3. Google Earth imagery of a surveyed minefield in Donetsk region. The
arrow indicates three visible lines created by a military mine laying machine.
The road is to the west and the tracks run in a south-easterly direction across
the field.

non-technical survey becomes ever more important. Where it can be difficult to establish a
pattern or logic to the minelaying through technical survey or the early stages of clearance, information from local communities and other
informants can often help mitigate this. A good
understanding of the tactical situation in a particular area at the time of the minelaying can often be far more effective than trying to rely on
traditional technical survey methods. Moreover,
there is an archive of high-quality satellite images of Ukraine available on Google Earth. Given
that the minelaying is relatively recent, predominantly 2014-2015, these images sometimes reveal evidence of minelaying that is no longer
visible on the ground. An example of this are the
tracks from a military minelaying machine, as

shown in Figure 3. Such imagery aids the accuracy of non-technical survey and can eventually
The type of minelaying in Ukraine varies between professionally
lead to more efficient clearance.
laid defensive belts placed in a clear uniform pattern, such as a line
Clearing tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metof evenly spaced anti-vehicle mines across a field, and sporadic mineal mines. The most common devices encountered by HALO in
laying. The latter being due either to low-level tactical considerations
Ukraine are tripwire-initiated hand grenades, anti-personnel
dictating the logic of where small numbers of mines have been placed
bounding-fragmentation mines (OZM-72s), both metal-cased and
or because of nuisance minelaying conducted by non-professional
minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines (TM-62 and TM-62P), and disoldiers or combatants.
rectional fragmentation mines (generally the MON series of anThe prevalence of this sporadic minelaying can often severely limit
ti-group mines). There is also the threat of UXO, ranging from
the usefulness of technical survey. It is difficult to find a pattern when
small-caliber cannon rounds to large-caliber mortar rounds.
there was no pattern or where the logic of the minelaying was down
Furthermore, many minefields contain a combination of different
to tactical rather than geographic considerations relevant at the time.
threats. Open media sources document that anti-personnel blast
Even in the case of defensive minefields laid in a clear uniform
mines such as PMN-2s and MS-3s, along with a range of improvised
pattern by professional military units, an operator’s ability to condevices and booby-traps, have also been used in the conflict, but at
duct technical survey can be limited if a large number of mines
the time of writing HALO has not found these types of items during
have already been removed by military forces or the local populaits clearance operations in Ukraine.
tion. These minefields still require clearance because some mines
The possibility of a wide variety of threat types, including tripmay have been missed. However, by removing mines from an area,
wire-initiated devices, has to be considered when clearing an area.
the original pattern becomes obscured and establishing where the
Of land currently surveyed by HALO and remaining to be cleared,
mine-line was can be difficult. This can result in larger amounts of
75 percent has a potential tripwire threat. The remaining 25 percent
clearance needing to be conducted in order to find a relatively small
are anti-vehicle mine-only tasks, of which 12 percent are minimumamount of mines.
metal mines and 13 percent are metal-cased mines.
Aids to non-technical survey. In cases where minelaying is spoMinefields that involve the clearance of tripwires, or minimumradic and the benefits of technical survey are limited, good quality
metal anti-vehicle mines, are slower to clear than land with metal
Average clearance rates in m2 by threat type

Metal anti-tank
Minimum metal anti-tank
Mixed threat
Tripwire
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Figure 4. Graph showing comparative speed of clearance rates measure in the square meters cleared, per team, per month.
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Image 3 and 4: A Large Loop Detector used for clearing anti-vehicle mines (left) in contrast to a deminer conducting tripwire clearance (right).
anti-vehicle mines only, without the threat from tripwire devices.
Additionally, unlike many countries with a historic legacy of mine
contamination, most of the tripwires in Ukraine are still intact, having only been laid within the last five years and being made of either
metal or nylon. This means metal detectors cannot be relied upon
alone as a means of searching for tripwires. As a result, a visual drill
involving the use of a fiber rod to guide the eye followed by the incremental removal of vegetation is required. This is intrinsically slow
when compared with clearance methods for other threat types (as
shown in Figure 4).
In minefields where there is only a threat of metal anti-vehicle
mines, deminers can conduct clearance by walking over the suspect
ground with a large-loop metal detector with the sensitivity calibrated to the mine-type. Deminers then manually investigate metal signals. This process enables clearance rates of over 50,000 sq m
(59,8000 sq yd) per team per month. This process is slowed, however,
when the threat of tripwire-initiated devices is also a possibility. In

such instances the slower tripwire search must be conducted across
the minefield before a large-loop detector can be used to look for the
buried anti-vehicle mines. Therefore, what would ordinarily be a relatively fast method of clearance is slowed to an average rate of 5,000 sq
m (5,980 sq yd) per team per month, by the presence or suspicion of
tripwire-initiated devices.
The clearance of areas where the threat of minimum metal antivehicle mines is suspected also poses challenges and is often slow compared with searching for metal-cased mines. This is due to the need to
use more sensitive detectors to locate the mines, which inevitably also
results in more signals from small metallic clutter being picked up that
have to be investigated through manual soil excavation to determine
whether a threat exists. This problem is exacerbated by contamination
from shelling thereby increasing the levels of metal clutter in the soil.
Moreover, Ukraine’s famously fertile chernozem soil is heavily mineralized, further limiting the range of suitable detectors. While the challenge of searching for minimum-metal mines is not unique to Ukraine,
in places where this threat is combined with
a need to search for tripwire-initiated devices, it results in a significantly more timeconsuming process when compared with
clearing other types of mines.

New Detectors

Image 5. A deminer using a ‘Minelab UXO-head’ detector, searching for minimummetal plastic cased anti-vehicle mines.

HALO is anticipating deploying a team
with combined ground penetrating radar
(GPR) and metal detectors in 2019. The GPR
detectors should enable metallic clutter to
be distinguished from anti-vehicle mines.
By being able to better distinguish between
clutter and the profile of an anti-vehicle
mine, teams can rapidly excavate clutter,
leaving the remaining signals to be excavated as per standard procedures. This should
increase the efficiency of clearing antivehicle minefields where there are large
amounts of metal fragmentation from shelling. Such detectors have had a significant
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make excavations incredibly slow and grueling. Enabling
work to continue in such conditions relies on using creative methods and respecting the tough conditions the
teams are working in. Ensuring teams are equipped with
suitable clothing and boots and have the facilities and
time required to warm up on the minefields is fundamental. In such conditions it is crucial to ensure deminers are able to maintain concentration to ensure safe and
efficient work.
Mechanical assets. HALO Ukraine is building its mechanical capacity and currently the program has two
front loaders and is looking into further mechanical options. The front loaders are currently being used to clear
areas such as former military positions that are difficult
and slow for manual teams. Having a mechanical capacity also enables some clearance teams to be deployed
through the winter months.
Figure 5. A diagram demonstrating the ‘quadrat’ method.
impact in other HALO programs such as Afghanistan, where in some
places it has decreased the number of manual excavations required by
over 90 percent, it is hoped the same success will be true for Ukraine.

Incremental Changes to Drills

Seemingly small innovations can make drastic differences to clearance rates. An example of this is the quadrat method, using a 2-by2 m (2.19-by-2.19 yd) boxing drill where lanes are cleared using the
standard manual trip-wire search drill to create boxes over which a
detector can be swept but without the need to use a fiber rod to slowly
inspect the area inside the box. The size of the box and the fact it is surrounded by cleared ground negates the presence of tripwires that are
not clearly visible and sweeping a detector over the top ensures there
is no device without a tripwire on the surface. Innovations such as this
have made the existing drill faster without compromising on safety.

2019 will see the trial and deployment of lightly armored remote vegetation cutters. The objective of these
machines is to support manual teams by cutting the
vegetation ahead of their progress on a task. It is expected this will
improve the efficiency of the drill by speeding up one of the most
time-consuming parts of the process: the careful investigation and
removal of vegetation. Depending on the success of these machines,
a lighter equivalent will be considered with the aspiration to deploy
them onto minefields where there is a mixed threat of devices such as
tripwires and anti-vehicle mines.
Melting frozen ground. During winter, fires are lit in safe areas
within the minefields to heat up a saline solution and provide warmth
during breaks. The saline solution is used to thaw frozen ground.
When a metal signal has been identified and isolated, the hot liquid
is then poured over the soil. The ground is then covered with cut vegetation, which acts as insulation trapping the warmth. This process
enables the ground to thaw overnight and makes soil excavations
possible the following day.

Challenges From
Extreme Climate

Over the course of a year in Ukraine the
temperature can vary across 60 C, and these
extremes pose additional challenges for mine
clearance. In the summer, temperatures on
minefields can reach 40 C (104 F), and over
the course of the long winter the temperature can drop to -20 C (-4 F). In January and
February, the months with the most extreme
weather, only the mechanical clearance teams
can work. Snow makes effective and safe tripwire clearance impossible, and the short days
and freezing temperatures can often inhibit
clearance on tripwire minefields for even longer from November to March.
The cold conditions also affect other aspects of clearance. Snow and frozen ground
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Image 6. A HALO Ukraine front loader conducting mechanical mine clearance
in challenging winter conditions.
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Image 7. A deminer excavating through defrosted ground.

Image 8. Deminers warming up in sub-zero conditions, to
the left is a barrel of saline solution.

Looking Ahead

Beyond security and access restrictions, the primary challenges
of conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Ukraine are from
tripwire-initiated devices and minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines.
HALO Ukraine is developing both technical and human methods
to overcome the challenges posed and to increase the efficiency of
clearing land. This involves using techniques and technology used
elsewhere in the world but also requires the trialing of new ideas
and innovations. Similarly, the challenges of working within the
context of Ukraine are, where possible, also mitigated and overcome through innovative means and where necessary through liaison with state bodies.
Ultimately the importance of optimizing clearance rates and
increasing the efficiency of HALO’s work in Ukraine is to remove
life-threatening hazards from ERW contaminated land. The more efficiently minefields can be cleared the faster land can be returned for
use by landowners and the community. Restoring land to its original
state helps the lives and livelihoods of those living in affected areas
return to normal.
Although seeking new innovations is important, the majority of the work is ultimately done by Ukrainian men and women.
High-quality training provides the skills required to clear the land.
Oversight and guidance from experienced demining team leaders
and supervisors in the field ensures that safety is maintained and the
quality and thoroughness of HALO’s clearance remains to the highest standards. It is therefore the quality of HALO’s personnel that is
the most important factor. Developing their skills and building their
experience allows HALO to deliver its lifesaving work despite the
challenges faced within Ukraine.

See endnotes page 69
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UKRAINE
by Edward Crowther [ OSCE ]
ICRC-installed sign warning of amphibious mines in the Azov Sea, Donetsk region.
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

S

ince fighting began in 2014, significant areas of the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine have
been contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). This article will briefly cover the origin of
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and its
mandate, before turning to the types of contamination observed
by the SMM in eastern Ukraine. On 21 March 2014, the 57 participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) made a consensus decision to deploy the SMM, and
the SMM’s mandate has been extended each year since. The SMM establishes facts and reports on the security situation across Ukraine,
monitors and supports respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and facilitates dialogue.
The SMM has around 600 unarmed civilian monitors in eastern
Ukraine who patrol accessible areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) forms a
major impediment to the SMM’s freedom of movement across these
regions, a fact tragically highlighted by a fatal incident on 23 April
2017 near Pryshyb, after which the SMM’s patrols have been limited
to asphalt and concrete surfaces only.1
In terms of mine action, in signing the Minsk memorandum in
September 2014, the sides have already agreed to remove all mines
and not to install or lay mines in the security zone.2 There is an
urgent need to clear contaminated residential areas, and items of
ERW pose a serious danger to civilians crossing the area between
the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of
the armed formations.3
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An unexploded PG-7L grenade lies by the side of the road in the
area separating the armed parties. The bottles were placed there
by locals to alert drivers to the presence of the UXO as emergency services are not able to operate in the zone, 7 March 2017.
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

TM-62P3 mine, Donetsk region.
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

Lack of Information

One of the key problems from a mine action perspective is the
lack of comprehensive non-technical surveys (NTS) in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, owing—among other factors—to a lack of access to large areas of the contact line as the conflict remains active.4,5
Many important NTS have been done, in particular in governmentcontrolled areas, but the international and government organizations
that undertake surveys are mostly unable to work in the contact line
area for obvious reasons, and no known form of NTS has been undertaken in the non-government-controlled areas.
This lack of information is a key impediment to the SMM, as it
undertakes its work in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and directly affects the safety of SMM patrol teams. For this reason, as well as
overall monitoring of commitment to the Minsk memorandum, the
SMM—while not a mine action organization—takes a keen interest
in the presence of ERW, reporting on these in its daily reports. This
information comes not just from SMM patrol teams on the ground—
which have unique access to many areas on both sides of the contact
line—but also via the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which
help the SMM to overcome some of the freedom of movement restrictions imposed by the presence of ERW.
Anti-tank and Anti-vehicle mines (ATM/AVM).6 By far, AVMs
comprise the most prevalent type of mine contamination observed
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The most common AVM type is
the TM-62M, with the plastic-bodied TM-62P3 also being observed
in fewer numbers. An unusual feature of the mine contamination

TM-83 off-route mine, Donetsk region.
Image courtesy of OSCE/Jacek Hajdukiewicz.

observed by the OSCE SMM, compared to comparable minefields in
other contemporary conflicts, is the prevalence of surface-laid AVM
minefields. These range from small minefields across tarmac roads
that comprise only a few mines to surface-laid minefields across large
open fields. An SMM UAV recently identified a surface-laid linear
minefield, most probably laid by a mechanical minelayer, which was
2.7 km (1.7 mi) in length and contained an estimated 900 AVM.7
The TM-83 off-route AVM has also been observed in small numbers in the Donetsk region, seen for the first time by the SMM in
2019.8 Additionally, parts of the coast in the Donetsk region are
known to be contaminated by PDM-1M amphibious mines. SMM
monitors observed some of this mine laying taking place, and the
same event was widely reported in open source media.9
Anti-personnel mines (APM). Prior to the start of hostilities, the
government of Ukraine had declared that no APM were emplaced
on Ukrainian territory. With the subsequent emplacement of such
mines, Ukraine in 2018 requested an extension of its deadline under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) to remove
them. The Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC granted the extension, until 1 June 2021, at its 17th meeting in November 2018.10
The SMM has observed a number of APM types across the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
The OZM-72 bounding APM have been observed across the conflict area, and has been reported on by the SMM on numerous occasions.11 Other AP mine types observed include the MON-series
directional APM and the POM-2 APM.12 The SMM has also observed
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POM-2 APM in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration station, Donetsk region .
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.

other evidence of APM use, such as the presence of the plastic
cruciform-shaped tripwire launchers from POM-2 APMs scattered
across tarmac roads in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration
station. OSCE monitors have been present during the demolition of
PMN-2 APMs by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.13,14
Unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM has observed and reported on thousands of items of UXO on both sides of the line of
contact. These range from small-arms ammunition all the way up to
unexploded 300 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets. An exhaustive list of all types of explosive hazards is beyond the
scope of this article.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams conduct spot tasks on
both sides of the contact line, and the SMM has enjoyed some success
in reporting items of UXO to the respective sides and advocating for
their removal.15 However, an area of difficulty is the area between the
forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the
armed formations, where neither side is able or willing to risk their
personnel in clearing items of ERW left behind by shooting.2,3
On several occasions, the SMM has observed items of ERW lying at the entry-exit checkpoints between the two sides.2 These entryexit checkpoints are already dangerous places for civilians, who are
exposed to long queues in areas that lack adequate shelter, water, or
proper sanitary resources, and who sometimes come under fire. The
presence of ERW in close proximity, sometimes only a few meters
away from queueing pedestrians or vehicles, only adds to these risks.
As an example, a PG-7L round was observed on 7 March 2017, lying on the H15 highway in the area between the forward positions of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations. 3,16
This entry-exit checkpoint is one of the busiest and is used by thousands of civilians a day. Owing to the lack of EOD capacity able to
work in the area between the forward positions, the round remained

26

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

on the highway for several days, indicated with informal marking, before disappearing, probably removed by a civilian.
Another issue of particular note is the presence of high-explosive
bullets across the conflict area. The 12.7 mm MDZ snap action incendiary round has a small, high-explosive charge. A number of civilian
casualties have been attributed to this round, with some occurring to
young children who have picked them up. Painted bright red, they are
often mistaken for standard incendiary rounds, and people are usually unaware of the dangers associated with them.

Conclusion

The lack of information on the mine contamination situation in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine remains one of the
key dangers to civilians in eastern Ukraine, as well as being one of
the main impediments to the SMM’s freedom of movement in the
area. Forwarding information about facts on the ground, including the risks posed to civilians by ERW, is one way that the SMM
makes a contribution toward a safer, more secure environment for
civilians.
See endnotes page 69
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A PHOTO ESSAY BY ROCCO RORANDELLI

THE ENDLESS WAR
Many modern conflicts leave behind unexploded ordnance (UXO) in their aftermath, inflicting severe human, social, —a nd economic costs. Europe is not immune
from this issue. Today, landmine-affected countries in Europe include Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia. With an average removal cost of EU€1,000 per
mine, insufficient funding is the main reason why demining is still unfinished in this
region after more than 20 years of work.1–-5 Every year, deminers and civilians die or
are injured because of ordnance explosions.
A common sentiment of all organizations involved in demining operations is that
greater funds are required to increase clearance capacity and demining in a timely
manner. The goal of this project is to bring the current situation in the Balkans to the
public’ attention. The following photographic documentation includes aerial photographs of minefields and demining operations as well as still-life images of exploded
ordnance, tools used by deminers, prosthetic limbs, and survivors.
See endnotes page 70

19 April 2016. Pristina, Kosovo. A prosthetic leg made by the
Orthopaedic Research Society (ORS) for a 31-year-old male landmine survivor. ORS is a Kosovo-based company working with German
manufacturer Ottobock. While governmental prosthetic legs cost
about €500, ORS products range from €2,000 to €6,000.
Survivors can afford prosthetics only through foreignsponsored grants.
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22 April 2017. Assia, 76, by her home in the hills
above Sarajevo. She stepped on an anti-tank mine,
probably activated by an anti-personnel mine. In
the explosion, she lost her legs, an arm, and
severely injured her back. Doctors say that
it is a miracle she survived. “After the explosion, there was a crater where we could
have parked a car,” says her son, who today takes care of Assia.
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20 April 2016. Banjice, Drenas, Kosovo. A deminer working inside a 30,000 sq m
(35,880 sq yd) minefield close to the village of Banjice. This minefield is planted with
PMA-1 anti-personnel mines from the Yugoslavian army. Two villagers have died; one lost
a leg, and one an eye in this minefield.

20 April 2016. Doganaj, Kosovo. Deminers work in a 100,000 sq m (119,599 sq yd) minefield located along a main road in Doganaj, contaminated by NATO BLU-97 cluster bombs.
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23 April 2017. Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Alija Svraka, born in
1960, is president of the association
for invalids, with 120 members in
Sarajevo, 50 percent of which are due
to mines. While a soldier, he lost his
legs in 1994 in Nišici while walking,
sixth in line, in a column
through a meadow.
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10 July 2016. Kotur, Sisak, Croatia. A path separating a demined portion of the forest (top) and
the contaminated portion of the forest that remains to be cleared (bottom).

1 July 2016. Doboj, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fertile agricultural area of Doboj is the most
heavily mined in the country. Here, a deminer working for The HALO Trust is probing the ground
along the borders for landmines. The area has already been cleared by a demining machine; however, clearance does not guarantee areas to be 100 percent mine-free, especially along borders.
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22 April 2017. Vitez, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Anita Vidovic, 26
years-old, works for Caritas Bosnia in Sarajevo as a kindergarten teacher. She lost her right
leg in Dubravica on 1 April 2001.
She was walking with her family
along a path near her home, last
in line, when she stepped on a
mine. In the explosion, she lost
her leg, and her cousin and aunt
were injured. With her disability,
she receives payments of about
€90 per month. “I think in BiH
people don’t talk enough about
this problem, which seems to be
hidden under a carpet.”
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4 July 2016. Dabar, Otoc̆ac, Croatia. A deminer walking inside a 1.8 sq km (0.7 sq mi) minefield. Demining was done in 2 shifts, from 8:00 to 13:00 and 13:00 to 18:00, with 50 deminers for each shift. On average, the cost to demine 1 sq km (0.4 sq mi) is €1 million.

13 April 2016. Zagermlje, Pejë, Kosovo. The controlled explosion of collected landmines in
a 42,500 sq m (50,830 sq yd) minefield, discovered in 2015. Deminers have thus far recovered 34 unexploded mines.
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23 April 2017. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nizam Cancar, 42 years-old, has played
with the Phantom club sitting-volleyball team since 1996, and won a gold medal at the
London Olympic games and a silver medal at the Rio de Janeiro Olympic games. On 6
October 1994, he lost his leg while working as a deminer and receives payments of €220
per month. Exactly 22 years after his accident, on 6 October 2016, his son was born.
“Our government has a problem talking about mines.”
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10 July 2016. Kotur, Sisak,
Croatia. A mined area inside
the village of Kotur.
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19 April 2016.
Hoqe e Qytetit,
Kosovo. A part
of a deflagrated
BL-755 cluster
bomb.

Rocco Rorandelli

20 April 2016.
Zagermlje,
Pejë, Kosovo.
Remains of an
exploded BLU97 UK-made
NATO cluster bomb.
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Rocco Rorandelli (Italy, 1973) started working as a documentary photographer after his studies in zoology,
which helped him develop a profound
interest in global social and environmental issues. His images have been
utilized in several awareness campaigns of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and published by the main international magazines, such as The New York Times,
Le Monde Magazine, GEO, Der Spiegel,
Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal,
Paris Match, Guardian Review, D di
Repubblica, L’Espresso, Internazionale,
Io Donna, Vanity Fair, Monocle, IL, and
many others. In 2011, he was awarded
a grant by the Fund for Investigative
Journalism for his long-term project
on the tobacco industry. Rorandelli
is based in Rome and is one of the
founding members of the collective
TerraProject.

Website: http://terraproject.net/
photographers/rocco-rorandelli

ITF ENHANCING
HUMAN SECURITY
by Gregor Sančanin [ ITF Enhancing Human Security ]

I

TF Enhancing Human Security has worked
in Southeast Europe’s (SEE) post-conflict
countries since 1998. In states affected by
the break-up of Yugoslavia such as Serbia,
ITF works to support the country’s fulfillment
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC), and this involvement has proved critical to Serbia fulfilling its goals.1
With a history of nationalistic antagonisms, a
series of armed conflicts, secessions, and major
political and state structural reforms stemming
back to the turn of the 20th century, the history of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Serbia is a long and convoluted one, intertwined with religious and ethnic tensions.

ITF deminers at work in Ravno Bučje, Bujanovac.
All images courtesy of ITF Enhancing Human Security.

Historical Context

Cluster Munitions

After WWII, the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia came under socialist rule, first as Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia,
and then in 1963 as the SFRY, a socialist federation made up of
the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. By the early 1990s, ethnic tensions dissolved into armed conflicts, as Croatia, Slovenia, the
Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from
the SFRY. 2,3 In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and later transformed into the state
union of Serbia and Montenegro.4 Since 2006, Montenegro and
Serbia are separate independent states. 5
All six former republics have become independent states. However,
many of these states, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,
have some of the heaviest concentrations of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the world. Serbia, which is contaminated with cluster munitions and continues to struggle with landmine
contamination, is the focus of this article.6 Issues relating to humanitarian demining in Serbia are numerous, and progress toward
a resolution of the mine problem largely depends on the provision of
adequate donor funds.7,8

bombs in 16 municipalities in the Republic of Serbia, namely Niš,
Kraljevo, Brus, Preševo, Bujanovac, Kuršumlija, Raška, Gadžin Han,
Tutin, Sjenica, Čačak, Vladimirci, Knić, Stara Pazova, and Sopot.9–11
During and immediately after the bombing, the armed forces and
police conducted clearance of unexploded cluster munitions from the
surface, which substantially contributed to the safety of civilians and
reduced the number of victims, specifically children. Numerous cluster munitions were deeply embedded in the ground and could not be
initially detected, removed, or destroyed at the time, which is why
surveys and clearance are presently needed to reduce the threat of explosive hazards for the local population.
Thus far, in accordance with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), 11.25 sq km (4.34 sq mi) has been checked and
cleared in the municipalities of Niš, Sjenica, Gadžin Han, Stara Pazova,
Knić, Brus, Raška, Kraljevo, Užice, Čačak, Vladimirci, Kraljevo,
Sopot, and Preševo, while it is suspected that cluster munitions can
still be still found in the 2.5 sq km (0.97 sq mi) area around various
locations in the municipalities of Sjenica, Tutin, Raška, Bujanovac,
and Niš.12–14 Many of the cluster munition clearance project tasks were

During the 1999 bombing, the NATO alliance dropped cluster
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conducted in highly-populated urban areas, such as in the city of Niš
(e.g., the primary school Dušan Radović, Niš city-hospital grounds,
Duvanište city-residential area, and the city’s industrial zone), as well
as in the Kopaonik National Park and Mountain Resort.15–17

Mines
During the 1990s, the Serbian Armed Forces placed landmines
along the border with Croatia (Šid municipality, including Morović and
Jamena). Even though there were no major military operations in this
particular area, the minefields were placed for preventive purposes.
In accordance with the ITF mandate, a mine action unit from
INTERSOS, an Italian NGO committed to assisting the victims of
natural disasters and armed conflicts, carried out a broader assessment of the landmine/UXO problem in FRY in 2001. The assessment
was collaborative and conducted with the FRY Federal Ministry of
Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior
of the Republic of Serbia.
After obtaining the relevant information, the Mine Action Centre
of Serbia (MACS), in cooperation with ITF, organized a specific survey of the suspected hazardous areas (SHA) in the villages of Jamena,
Morović, and Batrovci (Municipality of Šid), estimated to be 10 sq km
(3.86 sq mi). Consequently it was established that minefields, which
included both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines totaled an area of
5.9 sq km (2.28 sq mi).18 These areas were surveyed by MACS and
cleared by demining companies through ITF between 2003 and 2009.
There were a total of 44 project tasks, 5,139 various types of mines
and other UXO were detected, removed, and destroyed.19,20 Along the
borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, there are no more
minefields on the Serbian side, and these areas are now safely used by
the local population.21

Items found at Lučane, Bujanovac.

Post-clearance Effect on Demined
Land in Šid
Šid municipality consists of 18 large villages and towns with over
30,000 residents, including Morović village and Jamena village. This
entire region of northwest Serbia is known for extremely fertile soil
and high-quality forests, where mines directly obstructed agricultural development.20,22
The impact that minefield clearance had on this region was immediate. The agricultural land and forests were demined (declared mine
free by MACS) and handed over to local communities for safe use.
Mine clearance of this area offered great socio-economic potential
for the region and its residents, which was hindered for many years
due to mine fields.

Ongoing Clearance
In late 2009, the MACS obtained information about SHAs in the
municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Kuršumlija in southcentral Serbia.23 A survey of the area was conducted from 2009 to 2011
by Norwegian People’s Aid through ITF, where it was established that
at that time, there were 10 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in the
municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo, totaling approximately 3.5
sq km (1.35 sq mi).24–26
Since 2012, and with the support of ITF and its donors, these areas
are progressively being demined and resurveyed. In 2018, with the
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Explosive item found at Bujanovac, Topolska Malhala.

financial support of the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Korea, and the
United States, five project locations in the Municipality of Bujanovac
totaling 623,020 sq m (745,126 sq yd) of land was demined and released, removing 29 mines and 1,347 pieces of UXO. By early 2019,
1.8 million sq m (2.15 million sq yd) of SHAs/CHAs remained to be
technically treated and demined. In addition to Japan, the same 2018
donors have committed funding for 2019.

Post-clearance in Bujanovac
Bujanovac municipality consists of 58 large settlements, villages,
and towns with approximately 40,000 residents. The southern regions
of Serbia already struggle with underdevelopment, a lack of jobs, and
the population migrating north toward Belgrade or emigrating. In
such situations, the mined areas present an even heavier burden to the
local population and also obstruct even minimal investments and development. South-central Serbia has excellent climate conditions and
fertile soil. In normal conditions, the predominantly agriculturallyoriented local population would use every portion of land possible.
The impact of mine clearance in Bujanovac was immediate. The agricultural land, which was demined, declared mine-free by MACS,
and handed over to local communities for safe use, was used immediately by the local population for agriculture, wood/forest exploitation,
forest-fruits picking, cattle breeding, etc. Demining this entire region
would ensure enhanced human security, enable better socio-economic
development, as well as attract potential foreign investments.

Serbia and Treaty/Convention
Obligations
The Republic of Serbia acceded to the APMBC on 18 September
2003 (entered into force 1 March 2004).27 Initially, this committed
Serbia to destroy all anti-personnel mine stockpiles by 2008 and to
clear all mine-contaminated areas by 2014.28 Serbia later requested
and received a five-year mine clearance extension of 1 March 2019.
When it became clear that they also would not be able to meet the new
deadline, it submitted a second extension request on 14 March 2018.
On 30 November 2018, at the 17th Meeting of States Parties to the
APMBC in Geneva, Switzerland, the Republic of Serbia was granted
an extension of four years (until 1 March 2023). The extension request
includes a substantive plan, thorough year-by-year operational goals,
and defined milestones.29,30
Serbia did not sign and is not a State Party to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (CCM), even though it played an important role in
the Oslo Process that produced this convention. At the political level, Serbia supports the CCM’s humanitarian objectives. While Serbia
has participated in several CCM meetings, it has stated that it cannot
consider accession until its stocks of cluster munitions are destroyed.31

munition clearance, battle area clearance, training, equipment, and
structural support to national capacities (i.e., MACS). With generous
donor support through ITF, over 13.65 sq km (5.27 sq mi) of land on
91 projection locations has been cleared and released, with almost
7,200 explosive items (mines, cluster munitions, UXO) removed.
Serbia remains committed to resolving the mine problem, continuously contributing its own funds for activities of mine clearance for
the past three years. 32

Post-clearance Effect
The impact of mine, cluster munition, and other UXO clearance
in Serbia is always immediate. By clearing and declaring any type of
previously-affected land as free of contamination, Serbia can hand
over land to the local population for immediate use. Clearance of the
contaminated areas unlocks great socio-economic potentials for the
country’s regions and its residents.

Conclusion
Serbia’s experience highlights the importance of a collaborative,
multinational approach to explosive hazards clearance. Despite the
history of clashes and ethnic rivalry within and among the states of
SEE, the impact of landmines, ERW, and UXO often crosses political
and socio-economic lines and can contribute to regional destabilization. Ultimately, as Serbia continues to develop via socio-economic
and infrastructural reforms, any portion of land that cannot be used
safely is a wasted opportunity for local residents. To this end, ITF is
determined to continue its work in SEE, coordinating mine action
activities, victim assistance, and mine risk education projects with
respect to national and regional goals. However, in order for Serbia
to achieve APBMC obligations, continuous donor support is crucial.
The mine action process is vital for all spheres of daily life as well as
the local and national development strategy.
See endnotes page 70

Gregor Sancčanin

Head of Representative Office in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
ITF Enhacing Human Security
Gregor

Donors and ITF Support
The MACS was established in 2002 as an organizational unit of
the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a proposal by ITF to the
federal government of Serbia. Since the inception of MACS, ITF has
provided continuous support through technical equipment, vehicles,
training, and administrative assistance.
Since 2002, ITF has raised almost US$25 million from various
countries for activities in Serbia including mine clearance, cluster
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2003 to 2011, Sančanin was the project
manager for Albania, Montenegro, and
Serbia at ITF. He holds a Bachelor of
Arts degree in English and Literature from
Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana-Slovenia. Prior to working
in the humanitarian mine action sector he worked for seven years
in the Slovenian news, media, and television sector.

ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019

39

Image 1. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 –
Minefield Clearance and Casualties front cover.
Image courtesy of The National Archives.

Lessons from the Past:

Minefield Clearance and
Casualties – Holland 1945
– Military Operational Research
Unit Report No.7
by Roly Evans
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

I

n June and July 1945, two Royal Canadian Engineer officers,
on their own initiative, carried out a review of the ongoing
minefield clearance in Holland. The local military authorities deemed the review to be of significant value and therefore directed the Military Operational Research Unit to take up the
study and “carry out a complete survey and analysis of all aspects
of minefield clearance and casualties.”1 The study, entitled Military
Operational Research Unit Report No.7 – Minefield Clearance and
Casualties, Holland 1945, was initially intended to gather lessons
about minefield clearance casualties in relation to combat. It became
a significant study of demining during peace time. The resulting fiftyseven page document remains one of the best analyses of minefield
clearance, time, and resulting casualties ever conducted. Arguably, it
has not been equaled or surpassed since. To this day, few in mine action are even aware of it.

Image 2. Oberstleutnant Rudolf Draeger briefs Captain Misseldine,
Royal Engineers, on clearance in the Hook of Holland area, August
1944. Draeger was widely deemed to have commanded the clearance efforts in a highly competent manner, albeit his soldiers, categorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rather than prisoners
of war, sustained casualties that would be unacceptable in modern mine action.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.
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Mine Clearance in the Netherlands
As in other liberated European countries, wide-ranging mine
clearance in the Netherlands started remarkably quickly after the cessation of hostilities on 7 May 1945.2 Some limited clearance, mainly
of routes, had taken place in southern Holland during the previous
winter; however, concerted efforts only started when the occupying German 25th Army surrendered. By 20 May 1945, the Canadian
and British military authorities, represented by the Allied 6th Army
Headquarters, had overseen the formation of the German Draeger
Brigade, named after its commander, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant
Colonel) Rudolf Draeger. The brigade’s 105 officers and 3,244 other
ranks were formed from seven pioneer (engineer) battalions, a battalion of fortress troops already stationed in Holland and some other

Image 3. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed S-Mines beside a road in the Hook of Holland, August 1945. By this time,
the clearance of mines from the Atlantic Wall minefields was
nearing completion. Units of the Draeger Brigade had started to
move south of the River Mass to clear minefields on the old winter frontline between the Allies and the Germans. Accounting for
11.8 percent of all mines found, 127,591 S-Mines were eventually
removed by the Draeger Brigade in 1945. Relative to the number
removed, the S-Mine was known to cause the highest fatality rate
during accidents.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.

Image 4. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch, 2 May 1944, showing 900 Granatminen improvised from 270 mm artillery projectiles and T.Mi.Z.29
pressure fuzes. Artillery projectiles fuzed in this way were common as early anti-tank mines during World War I. As with many Wehrmacht
minefield records, to the quality and detail of this record enabled rapid clearance after the end of the conflict. The minefield of 87,688
sq m (104,874 sq yd) was cleared in two days by a Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in late July 1944.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.

assorted units. Notably, given the subsequent casualties, a German
military hospital and staff at Bloemendaal, west of Amsterdam, was
included within the organization of the brigade from the beginning.3
The Draeger Brigade would be responsible for the vast majority of
mine clearance in the Netherlands. Of the 1,377,898 mines cleared by
23 November 1947, the Draeger Brigade had cleared 1,079,857 mines
by as early as 31 December 1945.4 Some assistance was provided by
the Netherland Mine Clearance and Bomb Disposal Company (BD)
along with the 2nd Dogs Platoon, Royal Engineers (British Army).
Dutch members of the Waffen SS imprisoned in a former concentration camp in Vught, near ‘s-Hertogenbosch, given the opportunity of
better treatment if they participated, were also involved in clearance
in the south of Holland.5
The Draeger Brigade established its headquarters in Delft, between Rotterdam and The Hague. Work concentrated on the northern half of the country until August 1945, with most effort focused
on clearing the Atlantic Wall minefields on the coast. By October, all
Draeger Brigade units had moved south of the river Maas to clear the

minefields that resulted from the fighting between the Allies and the
Germans. A replacement German military hospital at Sterksel, near
Eindhoven, was placed under the Draeger Brigade’s responsibility at
this time. On 1 October 1945, the Dutch Mijn Opruimings Dienst
(Mine Clearance Service, MOD) took control of demining operations
in Holland. Eventually approximately 1,800,000 landmines would be
cleared in the Netherlands, some 422,102 cleared by the Dutch.6
The Pioneer Battalions worked extremely fast, especially when
compared with modern day clearance efforts. In part they were enabled to do this by the generally excellent minefield records kept by
the 25th Army. One example is Minefield 235 Goldfisch, (renamed
Minefield 20 in Dutch records) in The Hague. The minefield of ninehundred 270 mm artillery projectiles (Geschossminen), adapted to
be mines by fitting T.Mi.Z.29 pressure fuzes (which had anti-personnel and anti-tank weight settings), was laid by the Pioneer Battalion
of the 719th Infantry Division in five days during 18–22 April
1944. Covering an area of 87,688 sq m (104,874 sq yd) with a 194 m
(212.2 yd) depth and 452 m (494.3 yd) frontage, it was cleared by a
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remaining German records made up
minefield files that were completed when
the clearance certificate was added. All
documents moved under careful control
with the dispatch and receipt recorded
in an index book. Importantly, field and
master copies were carefully compared at
the end of the process for discrepancies or
irregularities as they were termed; essentially a form of data quality control not
always present in modern mine action.10
For the period July–November 1945, time
spent clearing in minefields was also
carefully recorded in other forms with
comparisons between units and sites
made to check for irregularities.11
6th Army HQ itself also recorded all
casualty data using a simple standardized pro-forma split into a section detailing the circumstances of an accident and
a section detailing injuries. Staff officers
sought casualty data wherever it could be
found, whether from unit medical officers, civilian doctors, or hospital records.
Image 5. Mine Map Book record of minefields in the Hague. Minenplan 235 Goldfisch is numbered
Minefield 20 and can be seen among the large rectangular minefields in the southwest corner of the
Corroboration of forms was made by inimage. The minefield site is now the playing fields of the International School of The Hague.
terviewing witnesses and by examination
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the Netherlands.
of the returned forms against unit daily records.12 This careful and detailed approach to operational data,
Fallschirmjäger pioneer platoon in just two days, 26–27 July 1945.7
very briefly outlined here, while unglamorous, was essential to the
Clearance of nearly 9 ha (22 ac) and nine-hundred mines in two days
subsequent operational analysis.
would rightly not be repeated in modern mine action, where such a
task would take many months. Such speed underlines the urgency of
the task and the risks that members of the Draeger Brigade were expected to undertake. The location of this minefield today now forms
the playing fields of the International School in The Hague.

Collection and Quality Control of Data
One particular aspect of the demining operations in Holland was
the great emphasis placed on recording and checking data. Both the
official 6th Army Confidential Report and the Military Operational
Research Unit Report No.7 detail at length the procedures followed.
First, all minefield records were checked, assigned serial numbers,
and drawn onto linen map traces by a Royal Engineers Intelligence
Section attached to 66 Field Company Royal Engineers prior to clearance.8 A color-coding system to denote German or Allied minefields was adopted: green for Allied, blue for German. Copies of all
maps were then bound in book form. An accompanying “Schedule
of Minefields” was developed, recording all known details to complement the maps. Records were duplicated into a field copy and a master copy. Minefield maps were issued to clearance teams from June
1945 onwards. By 9 October 1945, 4,522 minefields had been registered in this way. Eventually 5,400 minefields and 900 areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) would be registered in
Holland by 1947.9 Ten book sets covered the whole of the Netherlands.
Further to this overview, individual minefield maps and the
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Image 6. By 1947, 5,400 minefields and 900 areas were registered
by the authorities in Holland. The red dots in this image indicate
where minefields were found. Broadly the minefields can be divided into two categories; those on the coast forming part of the
Atlantic Wall, and those in the areas of the September 1944 until
May 1945 front lines. The latter tend to be near the Rivers Maas
and Waal, from eastern Holland to the coast.
Image courtesy of Defense Expertise Center, Explosive Ordnance
Disposal, the Netherlands.

Image 7. 6th Army HQ Minefield Map trace between the villages of Dreumel and Wamel on the Waal river, west of Nijmegen. German
minefields are represented in blue, Allied minefields in green. As minefields were cleared, the polygons would be colored in. A field
and HQ copy of this and associated documents existed, one being used to check the other for discrepancies. This was a small part of
what was in effect a larger data quality management system that enabled the subsequent operational research contained in Military
Operational Research Unit Report No.7. (The information on this map does not relate to any current clearance of minefields in this
area). The National Archives (TNA) PRO: CAB 106/1023. Military Operational Research Unit Report No.7 Battle Study. Minefield clearance and casualties. p.42.

Time Study
No study in mine action has ever recorded the man hours expended versus the mines removed on the scale of Military Operational
Research Unit Report No.7. Trials were conducted of manual mine
clearance methods in Moamba, Mozambique, from October to
November 2004, and while the record of this is more detailed in some
respects, it was a severely limited trial, not an analysis of a work sample as large as in Holland in 1945.
The study of “time and labor factors” in 1945 allowed an analysis
for each battalion of the man hours expended per 100 mines lifted.
This ranged from 57 to 78 hours—a difference of up to 27 percent
between units, usually explained by the different concentration of
mines between minefields rather than differences in operational efficiency. The more concentrated minefields required fewer man hours
to remove an equivalent number of mines.13
The time spent removing different mine types was also calculated. Metal anti-tank Tellerminen required on average 56 man hours
to remove 100 mines. Wooden, anti-personnel Schuminen, almost
Image 8. This table and similar ones in the Report No.7 (Table
5, p.17) underline the benefits of accurate reporting supported
by appropriate data quality control systems. Those overseeing
clearance in the Netherlands in the post-war years often had
much better information about what was found and in what condition than we do in many cases today. Which national authority or even clearance organization could produce such statistics
now? WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the
Netherlands. Appendix F.
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impossible to find with the detectors of
the day, required on average 70 hours. The
Riegelminen 43, required on average 97 man
hours to remove 100 mines, most likely because deminers were extremely wary since
wiring within the fuze mechanism could
function easily on handling due to the effects
of corrosion. In Holland in 1945, the Draeger
Brigade removed, on average, a Tellerminen
every 34 working minutes, and a Schuminen
every 42 working minutes. The fastest time
recorded in a given week for a minimum
sample of 1,000 mines was 15 working minutes for a Tellerminen and 20 minutes for a
Schuminen.14 Whether using the averages or
the fastest times recorded, this speed of demining is well outside of modern norms, even
in circumstances such as the dense minefield
patterns in Sri Lanka.

Analysis of Mines Found

Image 9. Draeger Brigade personnel count disarmed Tellermine-43s beside a road in the
Hook of Holland, August 1945. 200,456 Tellermines of all types were eventually removed
by the Draeger Brigade in 1945, a total representing 18.6 percent of all mines found.
The Tellermine-43 would be copied by the Yugoslav Army as the TMM-1 and would later
be found during the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans.
Image courtesy of Nationaal Archief.

The Draeger Brigade’s conscientious reporting also allowed a good overview of explosive devices found. For example, careful
records were kept of what mines were boobytrapped, what mines were assessed as being
in a condition that made them unable to detonate and which mines had been damaged by
the weather or corrosion. Less than 1 percent

Image 10. 6th Army HQ were able to use the casualty and mines found returns to plot the respective figures in two comparative
graphs. The graph underlines the significant casualties sustained by each sub unit of the Draeger Brigade and how casualties were
broadly proportional to the number of mines removed, albeit with the notable exception of the 346th Pioneer Battalion, which lifted
approximately 55,000 mines but had the highest casualty figures, greater than units that lifted up to four times more mines. The
346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schumine
minefields. WO 205/1186: Confidential Report on Mine Clearance in the Netherlands. Appendix I.
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dry earth, low-lying meadows, and polderland flooded since the mines were laid. The
respective aging characteristics of casings, igniters, or fuzes and detonators for metal and
wooden mines were noted in each of these
conditions. The report found that wooden
mines were unsurprisingly the most vulnerable to weathering, with 20 percent deemed
damaged. Anti-handling devices, especially cocked striker pull fuzes, were particularly prone due to “damp penetrating the
firing cap and rusting the spring.” Indeed,
aside from what casing was used for the mine
(metal being more resilient than wood), the
chief cause of probable failure of a device was
“the high percentage of ineffective igniters.”15
This is consistent with recent studies of mine
functionality in the Falkland Islands, where
of a sample of 100 P4B mine fuzes, only one
was found to be functional.16
Image 11. A Dutch sailor guards two members of the Kriegsmarine as they remove Tellerminen42s from an Atlantic Wall beach minefield. Dependent on which time period is used, between
0.87 and 1.7 percent Tellerminen were recorded as booby-trapped with anti-lift devices in
Holland. The image underlines the lack of basic safety precautions taken by most units at
the time, be it PPE or working/safety distances. Units that reduced the number of individuals working in close proximity tended to have lower casualty rates.
Image courtesy of Beeldbank WO2 – NIOD.

Image 12. No.2 Dogs Platoon checking the railway line between Eindhoven and Venlo, 25
November 1944. The report surmised the belief that dogs were “not 100% effective” and that
it was decided to use them to search long stretches of railway line and under high tension
cables. Dogs were not used as a search asset in areas known to be mined.
Image courtesy of the Imperial War Museum.

of the main anti-tank mines, Tellerminen and Holzminen, were booby-trapped, 2.33 percent of
S-Minen, and 2.97 percent of Riegelminen. This was less than the military authorities were expecting, having become used to German booby-trapping during the later years of the conflict.
Seven decades before the current studies of landmine aging, a relatively detailed analysis was
made in Holland in 1945. Ground conditions were characterized into three categories: sandy/

Analysis of Accidents
and Casualties
The Draeger Brigade sustained 563 casualties from 290 accidents in 1945, an average casualty rate of 17.5 percent of its final
strength. There were 165 fatalities, 29 percent of all casualties. Casualty rates for its
sub-units ranged from 6.1 to 29.6 percent.17
The landmines or other explosive hazards
involved in accidents were strictly recorded
allowing an analysis of the respective risk of
different mine types. Of the 563 casualties
from 290 accidents, 391 casualties came from
201 anti-personnel mine accidents, 69 percent of each respective total. In terms of accidents proportional to mines lifted, bounding
fragmentation S-Mines proved to have the
highest fatality rate amongst anti-personnel
mines. This corresponded to anecdotal experience of combat where soldiers routinely
feared the S-Mine for the number of casualties it could cause over a relatively wide area.
Even today bounding fragmentation mines
tend to require enhanced safety distances
during clearance operations. While there
were significantly fewer anti-tank mine accidents (31 percent), when they did happen
fatality rates were high as would be expected given the higher net explosive quantities
involved.18 The mean number of casualties
per accident ranged between 1.62 for the
Schuminen to 2.32 for the S-mine, with an
average for all types being 1.94.19 Safety or
working distances were not introduced during these clearance operations, and it is difficult to understand why such a simple safety
measure was not employed.
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Units were given a high degree of discretion in how they went
about clearing the minefields and considerable differences in procedure existed amongst them. The Battalion GROH, made up of former
“fortress troops” manning the Atlantic Wall, stated that there were
“never more than four men in any one mine-lifting party.” Whereas
in Battalion 526, twenty men could be “prodding and lifting in the
same row of mines.” The average size of mine clearance party working
in close proximity to each other in the Draeger Brigade was seven other ranks and one NCO.20 Battalion 526 had the third highest casualty
rate, Battalion GROH the lowest.21 Procedure was not the only explanation for casualty rates however, as the graph reproduced at Image
10 makes clear. In general the more mines a unit cleared the more casualties they had. As in modern mine action, explanations for given
indicators could often be multi-faceted.
Schuminen were the most common mine of any type found in the
Netherlands, with 229,431 cleared in 1945 alone.22 Despite some metal content, the mine was very difficult to find using the detectors of
the day and effectively posed the same hazard to deminers as more
modern minimal metal mines. Schuminen were normally detect-

searched by “war dogs” with 29 mines being found in this way. Dogs
were “fully justified on large areas of non-metallic anti-personnel
mines.”24 Much of this experience is reflected in the modern Animal
Detection Systems IMAS, where it is recognized that a concentration
of explosive targets can confuse dogs, and the need for strict accreditation of both handler and mine detection dog is mandated.25

ed using a standing prodding drill. This proved to be inappropriate
and dangerous. Resulting injuries to the face and eyes from primary
and secondary fragmentation were common, with rudimentary eye
protection proving only partially effective. This prodding drill often
missed Schuminen with casualties caused by stepping on them usually resulting in an amputation of the leg.
What was also significant about the Military Operational Research
Unit Report No. 7 was how casualty data could be analyzed in contect
of the good quality operational reporting overall. For example, the
study could calculate the number of mines lifted for each accident and
for each casualty by battalion. The figures for the eight units ranged
between the 20th Pioneer Battalion, who lifted 5,500 mines per accident and 2,720 mines per casualty (40 accidents), and the 346th
Pioneer Battalion who lifted 1,240 mines per accident and 580 mines
per casualty (49 accidents). For all the eight battalions there was a
rank correlation of 0.71 between the number of mines lifted per accident and the number of casualties per accident. 23 This could be explained by the differing working procedures in the field between units.
However, there were other explanations. The 20th Pioneer Battalion
tended to clear well-marked and recorded Atlantic Wall minefields;
the 346th Pioneer Battalion was employed for a considerable time in
the area of Arnhem clearing “unrecorded or scattered” Schuminen
minefields. It is believed context such as this was important in understanding the difference in performance. As with all performance indicators, the key was to use the evidence as the starting point to seek
further explanation. In short, the statistics allowed those in charge to
ask the right questions. The same principle applies when using statistics and key performance indicators in mine action today.
The study also contained recommendations concerning the use of
dogs in demining operations that resonate with experience in modern
mine action. The requirements for practice on dummy minefield and
the need for rest days in order to maintain the “interest of both dogs
and men” were deemed essential. Handlers needed to demonstrate
“care and patience.” While dogs had uses, they were deemed “not
100% effective.” It was decided that the dogs were not reliable enough
to be used on known minefields but were better suited to “routine
checking of suspect areas and the proving of and delimiting of areas
in which mines were rumored to exist.” 155 miles of railway line, 73
miles under high tension cables, and 77,000 sq yd (64,382 sq m) were

Much was done poorly during the clearance efforts in Holland in
1945. Casualties were very high, unacceptably high by modern standards, and the treatment of German Surrendered Enemy Personnel
remains contentious to this day. Clearance techniques were often rudimentary and safety precautions were often casual. Modern mine
action has in many ways improved significantly on the technical demining ability of those who went before us in the post-war years, with
better on-site procedures and personal protective equipment.
However, the limitations of the 1945 efforts should be seen in the
context of what was done well, and even what was done better. The
military authorities in Holland were ahead of their time in terms of
analyzing their own operations, be it in relation to the use of mine detection dogs, aging of landmines, time studies, recording of devices
found or the recording of casualties. Data collection and analysis was
in many ways superior in 1945 than during much of modern mine action. Quality management of data in particular is an aspect where arguably we have still not caught up. We can do better. We owe it as a
sector to the deminers risking their lives daily in the field to do so.
See endnotes page 71
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Conclusion
This brief summary of the Military Operational Research Unit
Report No.7 has given only a limited overview. The detail the report
was able to marshal is only partially reflected.
A number of German personnel continued clearance in Holland
for another two years. The last 19 German Surrendered Enemy
Personnel were sent back to the British Army of the Rhine for demobilization on the 3rd of October 1947. The final total of German casualties for both mine and ERW clearance in the Netherlands was 650.
Of these 225 (34 percent) were fatal casualties. Eighty-three Dutch
clearance personnel were also killed during the clearance effort of
their country.26
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FIELD NOTES

Accidents and Field
Medical Provision
by Andy Smith (AVS) [ University of Genoa ]
Image 1. A typical field-medic’s bag.

All images copyright of the author or public domain (having been published online in the DDAS for more than ten years).

N

o one knows for sure how frequently accidents

The number of hours worked, number of deminers actually

occur in humanitarian demining. This is partly

in the field, and the number of reported accidents and insur-

because the details of accidents involving state

ance claims were all made available. The results of the study

employees are rarely shared, and national laws

indicated that we might expect one severely injurious accident

often restrict access to police or military reports. It is also be-

per 32 field deminers every year. However, this ratio may be

cause there is a frequent failure to comply with the report-

misleading. The working context, the explosive hazards pres-

ing requirements described in the International Mine Action

ent, and the equipment available all have an impact on acci-

Standards (IMAS). IMAS 10.60 requires that “an accident

dent frequency, quite apart from the quality of the training or

in which a mine, ERW or explosives harms a demining em-

the supervision at any worksite.

ployee, visitor, or member of the local population” shall be investigated and the report made available. However, although
it is a requirement to share the results of investigations, it is
currently not entirely clear with whom the results should be
shared. Many accident reports were included in the Database
of Demining Accidents (DDAS) between 1995 and 2011, but
few have been shared recently.
Not having all the data means that it is not possible to provide
a well-informed estimate of accident frequency. The only known
study of accident frequency was conducted twenty years ago in
Afghanistan, when all insurance records were made available
along with all work schedules.2 The statistics on accident frequency presented in this article derive from the Afghanistan
study; all other statistics discussed are from the DDAS.

Image 2. A stretcher being used to transport recovered
mines in a minefield in Zimbabwe.1
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The data available to the Afghanistan study included all insurance claims, including those that were not related to explosive events. Perhaps surprisingly, there were more claims
related to non-explosive events than there were for explosiverelated injuries. The study also found that the consequences of
all medical emergencies were sometimes profoundly affected
by the level of medical and medevac provision that was available, a situation that has not changed.
IMAS 10.40 covers medical support to demining operations. It requires demining organizations to “be properly
trained and equipped to respond to demining accidents,” but
the medical support that it suggests is usually recommended, not required, because what can be reasonably achieved
can depend on the context. Among the limited IMAS 10.40
requirements that IMAS compliant organizations must provide at each worksite are skilled medics, appropriate casualty

Accidents in the working area are rare, so medics often

transport, an efficient means of communication, and an acci-

spends many hours sitting and watching the other team mem-

dent response plan tailored for each worksite. A study of the

bers work each day. However, they have to be ready to react

DDAS accident records provides strong evidence that these

swiftly and professionally if an emergency occurs, and the

are reasonable requirements.

DDAS accident records show that they have almost always

Features that influence the outcome of an accident are not

done this well. Medics have been a casualty in almost two

always causes of the accident. However, features can be things

percent of all accidents recorded in the DDAS, and in four of

that make the consequences of the accident worse. An inad-

these accidents the medic died. Six of these accidents involved

equate medical provision is noted in 14 percent of recorded

other casualties who the injured medic was unable to treat.

accidents, but there are no records in which a trained med-

To avoid risk to medics, some demining organizations re-

ic gave inappropriate treatment. In some cases there was no

quire them to stay outside the working area while a casualty

trained or appropriately-equipped medic, in others, there was

is brought to them. Other organizations allow the medic to go

no ambulance vehicle, communications system, or medevac

to the casualty as long as they always walk in safe areas. There

plan. In several, the casualty was taken to a medical facility

appears to be no advantage in preventing the medic from go-

that lacked the capacity to treat their injuries.

ing directly to the casualty, because most of the explosive-

The Provision of Skilled
Medics
Most of a field medic’s daily responsibilities involve providing mundane medications and first aid to the team, and
sometimes to the community where they work. The rarity of
demining accidents means that many medics have never seen
a severe demining accident, so their ability to respond appropriately depends heavily on their training and experience prior to working in humanitarian mine action.
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Image 3. A demining vehicle after a road traffic accident,
a common cause of deminer injury.

related accidents involving medics occurred in areas that were
believed to be safe. To reduce the risks associated with the
medic being accidentally incapacitated, some organizations
employ skilled medical assistants and, following the IMAS,
most organizations train all deminers in basic first aid.

Appropriate Casualty
Transportation
Appropriate transportation is often a well-equipped ambulance, but certain contexts may require a boat or a helicopter.

In Image 1, the field medic’s bag contains medicines that are

Whatever the vehicle, it must be available to transport a casu-

fairly typical. Most are for everyday medical problems rather

alty without delay. While some injuries are obvious and treat-

than injury because the medic often acts as the team doctor as

ment can begin in the field, other life-threatening trauma can

well as a trauma paramedic. The drugs shown are common an-

only be diagnosed and treated after reaching a well-equipped

tibiotics, anti-flatulence drugs, and treatment for infected gums

medical facility. The medevac vehicle must also be appropri-

and anxiety disorders. A well-equipped medic will also have all

ately fitted and equipped to carry the casualty securely, often

the equipment necessary to respond to a traumatic injury.

over rough ground.
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Image 4. The standard of ambulances used in demining varies from a mattress thrown into the back of a vehicle (left)
to hygienic and well-equipped vehicle conversions (right).

The demining ambulance shown on the left in Image 4

been missed during previous searches. The only means of

is obviously not a safe means of transporting casualties. By

communication was a radio that was destroyed in the explo-

contrast, the demining ambulance shown on the right is ad-

sion. There was no other vehicle, so no ambulance or medic.

equately equipped, but only for one casualty. In over 12 per-

Two deminers died at the scene and two others died while

cent of recorded demining accidents, there has been more

being transported to hospital in a flat-bed truck and in four-

than one casualty.

wheel-drive vehicles owned by the public. Their unplanned

In insecure areas, some demining groups always send a

journey took more than seven hours.3

back-up vehicle with an ambulance to provide assistance in

In another accident in which the ambulance was being used

case of trouble en route. Other demining organizations have

as a transport vehicle, it was travelling along a road believed

used different approaches with the deminers’ transport vehi-

safe when an anti-tank mine detonated under a rear wheel,

cle also functioning as the ambulance. In one of these cases,

and its long-range fuel tank caught fire.4 Three deminers died

a Land Rover being used as both transport vehicle and ambu-

and seven were injured, including both medics, one of them

lance was carrying eight people when it was driven into the

severely. By chance, another demining group working nearby

working area and parked on top of an anti-tank mine that had

was able to send their medic and ambulance to help.

Image 5. A converted vehicle capable of carrying two
casualties.

Image 6. A well-equipped demining ambulance with space
for only one incapacitated casualty.
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Image 7. A demining ambulance, after casualties were removed, that detonated an anti-tank mine with its rear left
wheel while being used as a transport vehicle.4

Image 8. A demining transport truck that detonated a
landmine en route to the worksite.

As well as providing a dedicated vehicle, organizations

reacted with self-discipline, searching for other mines while

should ensure ambulances are equipped to be as comfort-

their colleagues were being stabilized, and a second am-

able as possible for the casualty and to allow treatment to

bulance arrived quickly. The team had practiced medevac

continue during transit. In another recorded accident, a se-

procedures involving multiple casualties so they were well

verely injured casualty was safely loaded into the ambulance

prepared to react professionally.

before the driver crashed into a tree as he turned the vehi-

The accident record provides abundant evidence that a

cle around. The impact threw an unsecured oxygen bottle

dedicated ambulance vehicle and medic are needed. There is

across the back of the ambulance hitting the medic on the

also evidence that ambulances should not be used to trans-

head, inflicting severe brain injuries.

port deminers and should not be driven into the worksite.

5

A well-equipped ambulance with securely-fitted oxygen

The record also provides evidence of the need for more than

bottles like that shown in Image 6 cannot have the seating

one means of communication at every worksite and a well-

to safely transport a demining team and their equipment.

rehearsed medevac plan that covers the possibility of there

The provision of a skilled medic and a single dedicated

being multiple casualties.

well-equipped ambulance may not be
enough when there are multiple casualties. All demining organizations should
be encouraged to practice medevac involving several simultaneous casualties so that the medics become familiar
with the assessment and prioritization
of multiple trauma injuries.
In another accident, the demining
transport truck in Image 8 was carrying 25 people when it detonated a
mine while driving to the worksite.6
Fortunately the organization’s ambulance vehicle was following behind. To
ensure that there were no more mines,
search and clearance were conducted at
the same time as emergency treatment
was given to eight injured people. The
medic immediately made a radio request for assistance because there were
too many casualties to be transported
in the ambulance. Uninjured deminers
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Image 9. The picture shows deminers carrying a casualty down a mountain to
the nearest road and the ambulance.7
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Image 10. Around the world, the medevac varies from helicopter airlift to a relay of boats
and vehicles.

All Reasonable Effort
What is considered reasonable will often depend where the

DDAS is now a part of the demining Accident and Incident

worksite is. If medevac starts far from maintained roads or

Database (AID) housed in James Madison University’s Global

the nearest viable hospital, it cannot be conducted at an ideal

CWD Repository (https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-dda/).

speed but, knowing that the work will be conducted remote-

Its records provide many real-life examples in support of

ly, other provisions can be enhanced to reduce the impact

training and risk management. However, it is far from com-

of any delay. The team’s medic(s) should have the necessary

plete, which is unfortunate because the more detailed ac-

skills to diagnose, stabilize, and treat those in their care dur-

cident reports that it contains, the more use it can be. This

ing lengthy transit and there must be enough medical equip-

article proves that even old reports can provide useful evi-

ment and consumables to meet all predictable needs. When it

dence of what works and what does not, so all accident and in-

is known that alternative medics will not be readily available,

cident reports should be shared. Please send any accident and

trained medical assistants should always be available in case

incident reports that you have for inclusion in AID to cisr-re-

the medic becomes ill or is injured. Senior managers should

porting@jmu.edu. Names and identifiers are always redact-

maintain a detailed medevac exercise record and ensure that

ed so that no organization or individual suffers for sharing

the provisions are optimized to prevent the medevac itself

information that may help others avoid injury or death, and

from making things worse for the casualty.

which supports the professional development of risk manage-

To comply with the IMAS, practiced medevac plans and

ment in humanitarian demining.
See endnotes page 71

proven communications systems must be in place, however
remote the worksite, and coordination between all those who
may be involved in an evacuation must be established before
work in the hazardous area starts.
Whether by road, air, or river, medevac exercises should
be conducted to give confidence that all reasonable effort has
been made to recognize and overcome potential problems.
Conducting medevac exercises should be a priority for new
teams, or when starting work in new areas.

Andy Smith
AVS Mine Action Consultants
Website: www.nolandmines.com
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The Need to Share Accident
Reports
For more information about the events surrounding the
accidents mentioned in this article, please see the DDAS record number of each event as referenced in the endnotes. The

Palau, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe. He was
the founder of the Database of Demining
Accidents (DDAS) and served on the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) Review Board for 11 years. In addition to developing demining personal protective equipment (PPE), he has worked
at all levels in HMA from surveyor/deminer to NGO program manager and Chief Technical Advisor to UNDP country programs and is
currently a research associate at the University of Genoa.

ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019

51

FIELD NOTES

Booby-traps and
Anti-handling Devices:

COMMON TACTICS
by Michael Cardash [ Terrogence ]

B

ooby-traps are designed to entice victims to perform a physical action with an apparently harmless object that hides an explosive device that
leads to the device’s unexpected initiation. Many

booby-traps are improvised explosives devices (IED) and feature some kind of bait targeted to exploit emotions and the
anticipated actions of security forces or civilians, who will
initiate the explosive device in close proximity. Baiting is designed to attract attention and cause the victim to approach
the IED. It is intended to pique curiosity or instinctual feelings, such as the desire to help (bait in the form of a body or
an injured person), to profit (financial bait), longing (boobytrapped dolls used as bait in the Vietnam War), or those of
honor and patriotism (using flags to lure soldiers to a device).
Many booby-traps feature some kind of bait designed to
lure bomb disposal personnel closer to an IED and, in doing so, cause them to inadvertently step on a pressure plate.
Other traps entice the victim to perform a physical action
with an IED that will lead to its initiation, for example tampering with objects, such as flags or even weapons stockpiles
abandoned by the enemy or competing forces. Anti-lift and
anti-handling devices can also be improvised from other
explosive devices and create a hidden danger for explosive
ordnance disposal personnel. Such devices are often used in
conjunction with anti-vehicle mines to prevent tampering
with or removal of the mine.
On 17 February 2018, a booby-trapped Palestinian flag
was planted along the Israel-Gaza border fence, east of the
city of Khan Yunis. An Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) officer
approached the flag to remove it from the border fence and
was injured when it exploded as he laid it on the ground.
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Gaza border, 17 February 2018.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

The flag pole was booby-trapped with a victim-operated IED

mindfulness to the inherent dangers of these items that appear

(VOIED), designed to initiate when the flag pole was tilted.

seemingly-harmless. Attempting to exploit mundane military

The flag served as bait to draw in the victim (the IDF soldier).

or demining routines that invite complacency and reduce alert-

Dozens of Palestinian flags are removed from the border

ness among those who are being targeted for attack is a tactic

fence on a daily basis without incident, causing the soldier

utilized by terror organizations around the world. Using a weap-

to perceive this item as not dangerous, lowering the soldier’s

on or ammunition as bait in a booby-trap is one of the simplest
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The soldier raises the body of the mine, a distinct click is heard, and what looks like a lever can be discerned in
the sand under the body of the mine.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

traps to assemble. This tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP)
is known the world over and is considered a “classic.”

The use of grenades as anti-handling devices is one of the
simplest types of such devices taught around the world, used

On 28 September 2017, a Saudi Arabian soldier was report-

in the military in various improvisation situations and in in-

edly wounded while neutralizing a mine planted by Houthi

structional manuals produced and disseminated by terrorist

rebels near the southern border with Yemen. Video footage of

organizations. In the jihadi arena, there are instructional vid-

the incident reveals the attempted neutralization and the mo-

eos showing how to extract the delay element from time delay

ment the mine detonated. The documentation shows the Saudi

fuzes for immediate detonation.

soldier attempting to neutralize a TM-62 anti-tank mine.

In April 2013, a jihadi forum member published a Lebanese

After unscrewing and removing the fuze, the soldier next rais-

Hezbollah instructional video on how to make a booby-trap

es the body of the mine, after which an explosion is heard.

or anti-handling device with grenades. The instructor dem-

Upon closer examination, a lever can be discerned in the sand

onstrates how to remove the grenade delay element, causing

under the mine after the soldier picks it up, and a distinct click

the grenade to explode immediately upon removal of the safety

can be heard, followed a few seconds later by the blast. The

pin, without the usual three-to-four second delay. He then gives

anti-tank mine seems to have been fitted with a simple, im-

an example of how to use such a device to booby-trap a corpse.

provised anti-handling device in the form of a hand grenade

Using hand grenades for anti-handling devices with mines

placed under the mine with its safety pin removed, with the

was documented in a video circulated on jihadi forums in

weight of the mine holding the lever in place.

December 2012; the video depicted training exercises by a
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Removing the delay element from the Mk 2 grenade fuze and inserting it under a corpse.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

group of Syrian rebels called the Mujahideen Brigade, a local

As previously stated, there are jihadi instructional videos

contingent of the former Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in the Latakia

showing how to extract the delay element from time-delay

area of northwestern Syria. The video presents a practical les-

fuzes for immediate detonation. However, even without re-

son as well as hands-on practice in mine laying, where the

moving the delay element, the surprise of hearing the faint

instructor explains the components and operation of a Soviet-

pop of the exploding primer at start of the four-second delay

made PMN-1: a pressure-activated, anti-personnel landmine.

period can catch a soldier or the targeted victim off guard, al-

In the video, a grenade is buried in a shallow pit, serving as an

lowing sufficient time for the grenade or grenade fuze to deto-

anti-lift device for the mine then placed on top of it.

nate and cause the desired injury.

On 8 August 2018, the Syrian rebel group Junud al-Sham

Explosive devices targeting bomb disposal experts are usu-

published a video showing a training camp used by the group’s

ally secondary systems that are hidden from view. In these

fighters. The video shows fighters training how to neutralize

cases, there may not be any discernible indication from the

mines in the field. Additionally, one fighter demonstrates how

primary system that an additional system exists. In IEDs spe-

to detect and neutralize a Claymore-type IED hidden in some

cifically designed to target bomb technicians, one or more

bushes along a footpath, fitted with a pressure-release device

components (the battery, telephone, or wires) is clearly visi-

in the form of a Russian-made grenade fuze with a tripwire

ble in order to trick technicians into thinking that they have

tied to the safety ring and a grenade—with its safety pin re-

neutralized the initiation system or power source. Meanwhile,

moved—planted underneath the improvised mine.

the secondary device is concealed, sometimes completely

The grenade, without its safety pin, is planted under the mine and covered with soil, creating an anti-lift device.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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Neutralizing mines.

Images courtesy of Terrogence.

Detecting and neutralizing the booby-trap (grenade) from under the Claymore mine.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

Al-Karma, Iraq, January 2016.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

Collection of fully-assembled IEDs comprising mines
fitted with improvised pressure plates and anti-lift
boxes, Falluja, Iraq, 2016.
Image courtesy of Terrogence.

Nineveh, Iraq, November 2016.
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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IS anti-lift firing systems.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province.
Images courtesy of Terrogence.

Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province.
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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IS anti-tank mines, Al-Ramadi, Iraq, December 2016.
Image courtesy of Terrogence.

IS anti-tank mine with anti-lift switch.
Images courtesy of CAT IED.

separated from the primary IED with an independent power

or tampering systems, or using penetrating technologies to

source, while it actually constitutes an initiation system for

inspect weapons or ammunition, which most commonly in-

both the primary and secondary device.

volve mobile X-ray systems to determine whether containers’

In June 2016, the beleaguered Iraqi city of Fallujah was fi-

inner contents are legitimate or suspicious.

nally liberated from the grip of the Islamic State (IS) after a
month-long offensive. Workshops for the production of various IEDs, mortar rounds, rockets, and homemade explosives
discovered in the city were extensively documented by Iraqi

Michael Cardash
Senior C-IED Analyst
Terrogence

Security Forces and the media. Alongside fully-assembled

Chief Superintendent Michael Cardash,

IEDs comprising mines and improvised pressure plates were

the former deputy head of the Israeli
National Police Bomb Disposal Division,

white boxes. The purpose of these boxes was to serve as anti-

has served 27 years as a senior bomb

handling firing systems that would target deminers or bomb

technician. During those years he par-

disposal personnel who would lift up the mine after first neu-

ticipated in numerous missions defeating
IEDs and other counter-terrorist opera-

tralizing the improvised pressure plate. Since then, these

tions.

white anti-lift boxes and other anti-lift switches have been

He

commanded

bomb

disposal

units within the Israeli border guards and

documented on many occasions and in different regions un-

police during intense terrorist conflicts, gaining experience in-

der the influence of IS.

vestigating, and responding to the variety of terror attacks in-

IS has produced some mines with anti-handling features
that are externally similar to their single-function, plastic antitank mines. These mines also have a similar interior to the improvised IS anti-tank mine, with a mechanical-pressure fuze

cluding suicide bombing devices and incidents. Cardash currently
researches global IED incidents, is the Senior C-IED Analyst at
Terrogence, and authors the Terrogence Möbius C-IED reports,
which analyze and assess global IED-related technical and tactical intelligence.

located at the center of a concave metal plate inside the mine.
Some of the mines also have a built-in pressure-release switch
serving as an anti-handling device.
In order to avoid initiation by anti-lift switches and subsequent injury, deminers and bomb disposal personnel must
always be alert to the possible presence of anti-lift devices and booby-traps when handling IEDs, mines, or any other ordnance or items that can be used as bait. Precautionary
measures to prevent unnecessary exposure to anti-handling
devices should be taken by counter-charging ordnance and
mines by detonating the devices in situ, remotely pulling the
device using a “hook and line” technique to negate anti-lift
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by Jorge Rivero [ U.S. Marines ] and Tom Gersbeck [ Oklahoma State University ]

S

ince 2016, the Center for Fire and Explosives,

other countries throughout Cambodia, Len both enriched the

Forensic Investigations, Training and Research

tour and engaged everyone in attendance.

at Oklahoma State University (OSU) has

Following the CMAC museum tour, Golden West took

teamed up with Golden West Humanitarian

the group to its headquarters in Phnom Penh. Led by one of

Foundation to offer a training opportunity to military and

Golden West’s engineers, the group toured Golden West’s 3D

civilian bomb experts, as well as OSU medical personnel

Advanced Ordnance Teaching Materials (AOTM) manufac-

and students. During the second half of January 2018, a

turing lab, where they create 100-percent, 200-percent, and

group of civilian law enforcement bomb technicians, mili-

400-percent sized fuzes, landmines, submunitions, and other

tary explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, medi-

ordnance items. These accurate or oversize munitions func-

cal personnel, a lawyer, and educators visited Cambodia to

tion as training aids for anyone working in the fields of bomb

participate in the OSU Explosives Ordnance seminar con-

disposal, demining, or public safety.

ducted by Golden West.
Throughout the seminar, numerous topics like exploita-

the only remaining and most infamous Khmer Rouge prisons

tion, ordnance, explosives effects, medical treatment, and

in Phnom Pehn: the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, commonly

general demolition procedures were discussed and observed.

known as the “S-21 Schoolhouse,” which was an eye-opening

Moreover, future technologies in the field of EOD train-

and somber experience. Participants were fortunate since one

ing aids and field identification were presented to the group.

of the few survivors of the prison was there selling his book.

The training consisted of an intense week of explosives semi-

Gunnery Sergeant Rivero was lucky enough to speak with him

nars, life-saving techniques in a jungle environment, and an

and to see how vital telling the history of S-21 was to him.

in-depth approach to large-scale inerting and explosive manipulation. While the days were long and jam-packed with
information, the experience was incredibly valuable from an
EOD technician perspective. This article will summarize the
days’ events and lessons learned.

History and Additive
Manufacturing
On Day one participants met Len Austin from Golden
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Toward the end of the day, participants traveled to one of

Technical Overview and
Manipulating Energetics
Day two began with a two-hour trip down a single-lane
highway across southern Cambodia to the Kampong Chhnang
Training Center (KCTC). There the group met Len who familiarized all attendees with the area and gave a safety brief. After
a short lunch, Len gave participants a tour of the Golden West
compound and the Explosives Harvesting System (EHS).

West Humanitarian Foundation who provided the group with

Len explained how the facility supports demining opera-

a private tour of the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC)

tions across Cambodia as well as CMAC. Following the brief-

Ordnance Museum. As a former United States Marine Corps

ing and demonstration of the facility, Len demonstrated each

Master Sergeant EOD technician with over ten years of mine-

step in the EHS via stages. First, in the preparation area,

action experience working with Golden West in Cambodia,

which is located outside of the cutting house, Len described

the South Pacific, Caribbean, and throughout Asia, Len was a

the numerous testing tools that the organization uses for test-

valuable guide to explain the vast amounts of ordnance that

ing friction, drop, and heat. On the display table, Len began to

the museum holds, where it came from, and how it was ren-

explain how all six projectiles present were cut and displayed.

dered safe. With so much experience and knowledge of the

All six of the items were cut using different methods, so the

area and the types of ordnance used by the United States and

purpose of the display was well founded.

FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Following this stage of the process, Len took the group to
the cutting house in which a Russian-made 122 mm highexplosive (HE) projectile was being prepared for cutting. Len
spoke about the different modules used in this process, the
custom-made mounts, and where the machines are made and
purchased. Throughout the tour, Len’s primary concern was
safety, and he went into detail on the safety features for the
whole operation.
Lastly, the group left the cutting area for the command center bunker in which the 122 mm projectile was cut remotely.
After a short brief on the cut, the group made their way to
the mixing house. In the mixing house, Len provided a short

Students gather around Dr. Marcel Durocher as he explains different types of demining equipment, how they function, and the
science behind demining.
All images courtesy of the authors.

period of instruction on how heat is moved through a multilayered housing, which results in a radiant heat melting and
breaking the adhesion between the body of the ammunition
and the explosive filler. Upon the explosives reaching their
melting point, the explosives fall into the catch bin and are
broken into golf-size balls before moving to the heating container. At this point, Len and his staff gave the group a detailed briefing on different explosives used, quality control,
and what he and his team look for when melting the explosives. Upon completion of this step, the melted explosives are
poured into a high-heat silicone form, which makes their 100
gr boosters that the team uses to destroy mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Technical Approaches
to Success
Day three began with a short briefing by Len, who then

Dr. Durocher lectured on geology—surface and subsurface—
and mapping techniques to the class. Throughout the seminar,
Dr. Durocher provided instructions for eight different types of
equipment used throughout the demining community.

led the group to Golden West’s “Elephant Range.” Eight separate shots—or detonations—were scheduled, with each shot
having an ordnance item to be destroyed. Each shot was
briefed by Golden West staff and primed by its team while the
students were all accounted for at the bunker.
Shot one. 1,000 U.S.-made 20 mm HE projectiles were destroyed with the use of Golden West’s NMD liquid explosive.
This shot was one of the most educational. Experienced EOD
technicians conduct shots with thousands of pounds of net explosive weight (NEW). Using bulk explosives like C4 on these
vast shots causes kick-outs of munition debris more often than
not. For EOD techs doing large-scale demolition operations,
kickouts are becoming an even bigger issue due to the U.S.
moving toward insensitive high explosives. However, Golden
West uses liquid explosive, and the results of these shots are
astonishing. The liquid explosive allows for much greater HEto-HE contact throughout the process, which significantly reduces the probability of kick-outs and therefore reduces the

Two of Austin’s assistants pour liquid explosives into a bag
containing 1,000 U.S.-made 20 mm HE projectiles. This method, which Austin explained, significantly reduces the chances
of “kick-outs” during demolition operations. After completing
the shot, all participants searched for kick-outs, and none
were found.
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chances of having ordnance scattered
through a demolition area. With plastic explosives like C4, HE-to-HE contact
can be achieved on some or most parts of
the ordnance item but not all.
Shot two. Five Chinese 60 mm HE
mortars were filled with dinitronaphthalene (DNN) explosives using liquid explosives for the detonation. This
shot was significant in showing once
The 1,000 20 mm HE Projectiles that Austin used on his liquid explosives shot.

again the power of liquid explosives to
dispose of DNN, which is known to be
an incredibly insensitive munition that
offers substantial problems during the
disposal phase of EOD operations.
Shot three. One Russian-made TM46 anti-tank landmine containing 5.7
kg of TNT. For this shot, the 100 gr EHS
booster was used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the explosives.
Shot four. One Russian-made 122
mm artillery projectile containing HE
was detonated. During this shot, another 100 gr EHS booster was used to demonstrate its ability to penetrate a ½-inch
thick plate of steel.
Shot five. One Chinese-made 120
mm mortar containing HE was used.
For this, a 35 gr SEA-91 was used. SEA-

Austin from Golden West fills a shaped charge container with 35 ml of NMD liquid
explosive

91 is a homemade pliable explosive made
via the EHS. This shot was once again
done to demonstrate the ability of these
EHS products.
Shot six. One U.S.-made 105 mm
white

phosphorous

(WP)

projec-

tile was used. Another SEA-91 tool
was placed in the fuze well to demonstrate destroying WP-filled munitions, which are extremely dangerous
for EOD technicians.
Shots seven and eight. These
shots consisted of 40 mm thick steel
plates placed on the ground, hit with
two shots. The shots demonstrated the
effectiveness of the explosives made at
the EHS. For the first shot, a 100 gr EHS
booster was placed touching the plate
Exit hole in 40-mm thick steel plate from the 35-ml NMD shaped charge.
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and detonated creating the spalling

effect on the plate. The second shot used 35 gr of liquid NMD

Shot three. The EHS charges were all chosen randomly

in a container positioned with a standoff of 75 mm and deto-

from the lot, transferred to the range and detonated on steel

nated. The precision and penetration of these two charges im-

plates. For the lot to pass certification, all three of the shots

pressed everyone in attendance.

must penetrate the plates, which all three did.

After lunch, Golden West’s Dr. Marcel Durocher provided
classes on geology, surface and subsurface search, and map-

Conclusion

ping techniques. Dr. Durocher also provided instruction on

For those in attendance of OSU and Golden West’s collab-

eight different types of equipment used throughout the dem-

orative training opportunity, the experience taught valuable

ining community.

lessons that participants took back to their respective fields.

Interconnections Between
Victims, Bomb Disposal,
and Medical Personnel
Day four began with a safety briefing from Len and
movement to the Elephant Range. The demonstrations involved two 80-lb pigs due to the close resemblance with the
human body and ease of acquisition; both pigs were euthanized roughly one hour before shots occurred. Having a
medical doctor and 4th-year medical student within the
group, the training capitalized on the opportunity to analyze

For those in attendance, the experience was one-of-a-kind.
It is the authors’ hope that Golden West can host additional
courses so that other military members, civilian bomb squads,
and medical personnel also can benefit. The world we live in,
which is full of unpredictable regimes, volatile situations, and
terrorist groups, only leads one to understanding the need
for well-educated and trained people who are willing to help
those trying to survive in formerly- and currently-contested
areas contaminated with mines and UXO. In 2020, OSU and
Golden West will be hosting another training course February
24–28. For more information, please contact Tom Gersbeck at
tom.gersbeck@okstate.edu.

the effects of these ordnance items, as the medical personnel expertly detailed the external and internal injuries suffered. Three shots were planned in which two would involve
the pigs, and the third was a quality control shot of the new
batch of EHS boosters. All students remained in the downrange safety bunkers while the shots were prepared.
Shot one. The first pig was in a standing position with
its rear legs touching the ground and wearing military-style
boots. A Russian-made PMN-1 anti-personnel blast mine was
positioned underground beneath the pig’s rear right foot.
After detonation, Len sent Golden West‘s drone downrange to ensure it was safe for personnel. Upon arriving on
site, we saw the pig on the ground with wounds consistent
with mortal injuries. Once all students were present, Karley
Koch, a 4th-year medical student at OSU, dissected and
provided details on the pig’s injuries, severity, and survivability of those injuries.
Shot two. The second pig was secured between two small

Jorge Rivero

Gunnery Sergeant
Marines EOD Technician
Jorge Rivero is an active duty Marine EOD
technician. Rivero joined the EOD field in
2011 after multiple infantry deployments
to Iraq, Haiti, and the Middle East. After
graduating from Naval School Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (NAVSCEOD), he deployed to Afghanistan in 2013 and to
Europe and Africa in 2015 where he
served at Second EOD Company as a Team Member and EOD
Team Leader. Rivero holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
from Arizona State University and is currently enrolled in George
Washington University’s master’s program.

Tom Gersbeck, MFS

Military Liaison; Graduate Faculty Member
Oklahoma State Center for Improvised Explosives

trees at a 45-degree angle with a sheet of plywood to its left. A

Tom Gersbeck is a retired Marine EOD

Russian-made POMZ fragmentation mine was positioned one

Officer, and has been an International

meter from the pig and 1 ft (0.3 m) off the ground. After detonation, the pig was laid on the ground and split open. Koch
again examined and dissected the pig. While narrating the results, Koch provided first-hand knowledge of the injuries and
probability of survival of a human being, concentrating on a
child weighing approximately 75 lbs.

Association of Bomb Technicians

and

Investigators (IABTI) member since 1991.
Currently, Gersbeck is the Military Liaison
and in the Oklahoma State Center for
Improvised Explosives or IMPEX in the
school of Forensic Science. He continues his work as a training coordinator for the Golden West
Humanitarian Foundation.
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Drones in the Desert: Augmenting HMA and
Socio-Economic Activities in Chad
by John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere, Emmanuel Sauvage, and Pierre Gallien [ Humanity & Inclusion (HI) ]
Figure 1. The team approaches a minefield for the first consumer drone cartography flight over a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in Chad.
All images courtesy of the authors.

F

unded by the Belgian Directorate-General for Development and
led by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) under the auspices of the
National Mine Action Centre, Haut Commissariat National au
Déminage (HCND) in Chad, the Odyssey2025 Project explores ways to
accelerate land release for the local population with the combined use of
small drones, new survey methods, and mobile data collection. Project
partners include Mobility Robotics, Dynergie, InZentive, and Third
Element Aviation. A practical, field-driven approach is being undertaken together with partners in the PRODECO project, (MAG) Mines
Advisory Group, and Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD).
Online literature is available that discusses the pros and cons of different types of drone airframes, and how the mapping process takes
place. A good starting point for further reading is the FSD Drone Portal:
www.drones.fsd.ch; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining’s (GICHD) recently launched e-learning portal: https://gichd.
litmos.com, which provides information about how to integrate drones
into humanitarian mine action (HMA); and the articles featured within
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction on the use of drones
in HMA.1–8
On 24 January 2019, the authors created the first drone cartography
of a minefield near the village of Amoul, in the Faya-Largeau area of
northern Chad. The goal of this first mission was to validate how drones
can provide better situational awareness of suspected hazardous areas
(SHA), confirmed hazardous areas (CHA), and zones clear of contamination in desert conditions. This campaign is part of a broader trial to
determine how small drones can help to accelerate the land release process and gain operational efficiencies. The next stages include assessing the effectiveness of drone data to tighten the definition of SHA/
CHA borders, indicate where land might be cancelled or reduced, and
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achieve more targeted technical survey. Other practical benefits will
also be explored by combining drone and HMA expertise during embedded field trials.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
Where possible, the authors have tried to leverage the data capture potential from relatively low-cost, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones.
The concept of operations presented here takes COTS equipment and
software, and combines known processes and defined indicators to generate actionable operational intelligence. Rather than try to reinvent the
wheel, these tests strive to get better mileage from existing equipment
and software that is already accessible to the community.
A starting point was using indicators of direct evidence listed in
07.11(5.3) Land Release of the International Mine Action Standards,
with signs of contamination including visual observation of explosive
ordnance (EO) parts, craters, detonations by animals, mine signs, fencing, EO accidents, or incidents where the location of the event could be
accurately determined. Initial indicators of an absence of contamination
include roads in use, land used for certain types of agriculture, and footprints from large animals. Work is ongoing with HI technical staff, and
the national mine action center (MAC) to validate further direct and
indirect indicators. The January mission trialed new equipment such as
the first sub-1 kilogram drone with variable optical zoom: the DJI Mavic
2 Zoom (M2Z).9 Video goggles were also tested, to determine how useful a more immersive live experience would be during inspection and reconnaissance operations. For example, an explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) specialist might want to direct the pilot to fly closer to or around
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staff as high-resolution, offline, Google Earth layers—making GIS data
viewable on every laptop, prompting discussions regarding how to prioritize the deployment of technical survey assets.

DJI MAVIC 2 ZOOM
Take-off weight

905 grams

Max flight time

25 minutes

Max range

More than 2 km

Size (diagonally)

354 mm

Max Windspeed

~35 kph

Figure 2. Small but powerful, the DJI Mavic 2 Zoom captured all the
data in this article.

objects.10 These devices can also be useful during improvised explosive
devices disposal (IEDD) operations.
SOFTWARE AND APPS
The cartography flight-planning process involved importing a SHA or
CHA polygon from the MAC Information Management for Mine Action
(IMSMA) database into a drone autopilot app before leaving for the field.
Each MAC has a database of SHA or CHA points and polygons, collected years or decades prior. If a polygon does not exist, a flight plan covering a greater footprint than the area of interest will be programmed.
Three different flight-planning apps were tested.11–13 Poor internet connectivity was a particular challenge while working in the desert, and the
plan needed to account for that.
DATA PROCESSING
Images from mapping flights were processed with COTS photogrammetry software to create orthomosaic, topographic, and digital surface
model (DSM) outputs.14 Data outputs were analyzed and post-processed
in geographic information system (GIS) software using ESRI’s ArcMap
application.15 Data sets were also provided to HI and MAC technical

Figure 3. Cartography of the second test location shows a CHA surrounded by mixed terrain and natural features such as sand dunes,
rocky outcrops, and sparse vegetation. The resolution captured was
approximately ten times that from civilian satellites.

MISSION PLANNING
Two modes of operation were used:
• Relatively low-altitude inspection flights, remaining stationary at
times to hover, circle, and zoom, capturing snapshots of evidence
points during inspection and reconnaissance missions.
• Programming mapping missions to automate data capture in a
set way to generate cartography and topographic information.
During the first trial, the purpose of drone inspection missions was
for planning to gather evidence for EOD specialists to make judgments
regarding the cause of explosions at accident locations and discuss the
probability of nearby hazards. Mapping missions were used to create an
area overview of the entire CHA, looking for patterns and to function as
a base map for operational planning.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Human intelligence from mine action specialists is just as important
as an ambitious data-capture strategy and can provide answers to “so
what” questions regarding features identified in cartography and inspection data. For example, identifying a pattern of recent tire tracks
across a CHA can impact operations in different ways, depending on
interpretation. Tire tracks indicate that members of the public are driving through the CHA, which might signal a need to better mark the perimeter with warning signs, or conduct mine risk education (MRE) in
the area, perhaps elevating the priority of technical survey or clearance
of that site to prevent accidents. Or perhaps tire tracks hint that a portion of the polygon is clear of contamination because an explosion did
not occur when a vehicle drove through, suggesting an adjustment of
CHA borders. This example also provides insight into how drone data
can influence different aspects of HMA activities ranging from MRE to
clearance. Collaborative research will continue during the length of the
one-year project, determining which features are most useful and documenting outcomes under field conditions.
GROUND SIGN INDICATORS
The true value of drone data will be determined by how it can
augment operations on the ground: capturing evidence-points, features of interest, patterns, man-made anomalies, or other clues that
provide hints of what might (or might not) be under the ground.
Moreover, by providing a better understanding of the terrain, drones
can help identify hazards, access points, or elements that might pose
challenges for operations.
In some cases, it will be beneficial to re-survey a SHA or CHA to gain
additional knowledge such as patterns not visible from a ground-level
perspective, helping target technical survey or clearance assets by directing them to hot spots first. In other cases, EOD specialists might
deem that CHA borders can be redefined. Working closely with the chief
of ops and technical field managers (TFM) is important to align strategies with the end users of drone data products.
Hence, a key objective during the first mission was to collaboratively
develop a catalogue of ground-sign indicators and prove how using cues
from the catalogue can influence operations on the ground. Creating a
framework for generating valuable, actionable intelligence is central to
process innovation.
TEST LOCATIONS
Field tests took place in three locations, providing a mix of terrain,
ground signs, and objects to inspect or map. The first site was a minefield (Figure 4 and Figure 5) where demining teams were conducting
technical survey in a CHA. The second CHA location (Figure 3) was a
battle area clearance site where a destroyed vehicle was carrying 122 mm
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rockets. Imagery from these two post-conflict
sites will be added to a ground-sign database to
calibrate against in the future. The third test site
(Figure 9) was a training location for HI’s GCS250 demining machine to create slope maps for
planning mechanical operations.16

RESULTS
GROUND-SIGN INDICATORS
In Figure 4, Images 1 and 2 show how overhead photos of ground signs can be captured by
an operator standing 200 meters away, outside
of the CHA. Image 1 is evidence of a camel accident, with a blast crater next to it, and possibly a
second crater under the animal bones. Image 2
is evidence of a vehicle accident, with the blast
area possibly under the left front wheel.
Image 3 shows how cartography can help to
join the dots between Image 1 and Image 2. If
you draw a line in Image 3 between the two accidents, it appears that they occurred along an old
road. A pattern is visible on the ground, which
may be weathered signs of its presence. Piecing
all the information together suggests that the
road may have been mined because of its strategic nature during the conflict. Or perhaps this
man-made pattern relates more directly to the
conflict, or subsequent post-conflict operations?
Whatever the case, based on imagery analysis, Figure 4. Image 1 shows an example of a ground sign indicator, an animal accident, and craters
more targeted technical survey is required in (red circles). The white shading shows a technical survey lane (visible in all images) that was
opened to investigate. Image 2 shows another ground sign indicator: a vehicle accident. Image
that area.
Tests showed how inspection flights can dis- 3 shows a consumer drone cartography output. By drawing a line between the two red circles
in this image, one can see possible signs of an old road, which is another indicator. Note the
tinguish fine details from different perspectives technical survey lanes for access to accident spots, shaded in white.
for a bigger picture, with cartography capturing
the whole polygon (Figure 5) to look for patterns.
The crater next to the animal accident in Figure 4, Image 3 is visible
the crater next to the animal bones in Figure 4 Image 1 to be 2.15 meters in
from a higher (cartography) flying altitude, but individual bones are difdiameter. Such information can affect planning by indicating whether the
ficult to see from that height. Figure 4 demonstrates how a combination
explosion was from an anti-personnel or anti-tank mine.
of imagery from inspection and cartography flights can complement
HIGH-RESOLUTION TERRAIN MAPPING
each other. Personnel can also return and inspect hot spots more closely
Mapping terrain and other elements of the natural environment can
if technical advisors want more information.
help many aspects of HMA operations. However, the process of creatEVIDENCE-BASED SURVEY
ing maps from drone data is more involved than the process for inspecThese results provide field examples of how high-resolution imagery
tions. Thus, field validation in-country was important, e.g., proving that
and cartography can assist the HMA process. A starting point was reit was viable to map sand dunes. Figure 6 shows the results of a sand
surveying CHAs currently being worked on by ground teams to identidune mapping test, with Image 1 being a high-resolution orthomosaic
fy indicators and ground truth data, calibrate resolution, quality-check
map that shows how sand dunes can be recognized visually. Image 3 of
mapping capabilities of a sub-1 kilogram drone, and gain validation
Figure 7 shows how a topographic map was created by post-processing a
from EOD personnel. The data also shows how several different obserDSM from drone data. Although it was initially unclear, the reflectivity
vations can be linked together, which can increase confidence levels for
and texture of sand did not make a difference, and standard techniques
decision making.
were fine. Mapping sand dunes is of interest as they tend to move, affecting access to sites by covering/uncovering contamination.
SPEED
The ability to map roads was also field-proven, which will be useful
It only took a few hours on-site to capture all the raw data regarding
because demining roads is a priority in many locations.
the minefield, proving how fast reconnaissance and cartography data
The usefulness of being able to spot rocky outcrops, unfavorable tercapture can be compared to opening technical survey lanes to examine
rain, and other hazards for demining machines was validated, in assohot spots. After the raw data was captured, cartography took about a day
ciation with the mechanical operations team (Figure 3 and Figure 9).
to process per site back at the base.
Data was captured (Figure 9) to help plan how the drone and demining
MORE TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS
machine can work together. Figure 9 shows a slope map, indicating difBeing able to move a camera in three-dimensional space and capture
ferent terrain inclines at the machine training site (top right, green area).
imagery from directly above means scope for more technical interpretaThe idea was to identify locations where the demining machine can extions of data. From the drone data, the authors determined that the size of
cel, and map out hazards in advance, so that the amount of time and money
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Figure 5. Digitized high-resolution cartography of the complete CHA polygon from Figure 4. This was analyzed closely by technical specialists
to discuss operational implications of features identified by the aerial intelligence.

spent on repairs are reduced. There are many ideas to field test across multidisciplinary teams next mission.
QUALITY OF MICRO DRONE ZOOM
Results of variable optical zoom tests from the M2Z were positive,
with sample data from 25 meter and 119 meter heights shown in Figure
7 and Figure 8.
Original photos from the drone are shown in Figure 7 Images 1 and 3,
and in Figure 8 Images 5 and 7. Differences that the two times zoom makes
in object detail and image footprint can be seen in columns on the left.
Sections of each photo were reviewed at very high magnification on
a PC to compare fine details. For example, a difference in sharpness
can be seen along the edges of the rocket body and in the details of the
human footprints when comparing Figure 7 Images 2 and 4 at a 25meter height. Improvements in detail and sharpness are also visible
when comparing the zoom to standard perspective in Figure 8 Images
6 and 8 at a 119-meter height.
Testing also took place to review the
quality of an additional variable two
times digital zoom (total four times) in
high-definition (HD) video mode, i.e., the
ability to zoom from 24 millimeters to 96
millimeters (equivalents). The quality was
acceptable, and helped capture more detail without having to fly closer.
One of the key findings was that up to
four times variable zoom in HD video
mode (two times for photos) was easy to
operate while flying. The operator can adjust the zoom by moving a wheel on the
controller, providing greater utility than
other drones in that class. The option to
capture a more tailored perspective while
in flight will simplify workflow back at
the base, negating the need for post-processing analysis of features of interest.
The outcome from these tests was to
validate that the M2Z as an effective tool
with additional inspection capabilities.
VIDEO GOGGLES
Glare can be an issue in the desert, so
enclosing an observer’s view and placing
the display close to his/her eyes means a
more immersive experience, with much

greater magnification. Several EOD specialists tried the video goggles
as part of a combined drone/EOD team scenario, and feedback was
positive. One of the best tests will be during EOD spot tasks next mission. A more immersive, live experience will allow a specialist observer
to inspect evidence of hazards from a safe distance and better assess a
site in real time. Gaining a high-quality camera view, moving in threedimensional space, flying around objects, viewing from different perspectives/angles ranging from up-close inspection to a broad footprint
of the area from a higher altitude, which will help save time. Searching
a broader area around the perimeter is often faster from in the air than
on the ground. CHAs can be several hours drive from the base, meaning
that becoming more productive per visit will improve efficiency.
The video goggles also proved to be a useful educational tool, allowing deminers to gain a birds-eye perspective, as if they were flying inside
the drone. Dozens of people got to try.
For more information about results from the January field mission,
including flying videos and sample data see: www.mr-au.com/chad.

Figure 6. Image 1 is a high-resolution optical (orthomosaic) map showing the ability to identify sand
dunes visually. Image 2 is a ground reference photo taken of nearby sand dunes to check against
cartography (Images 1 and 3). Image 3 is a high-resolution terrain map of sand dunes from data
captured during the same consumer drone flight as for Image 1.
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Figure 7. Two photos taken from the M2Z at a height of 25 meters: Images 1 and 3. Image 1 is at a standard wide-angle
perspective. Image (3) was taken at the same height but used the two times optical zoom. Image 1 and 3 show the differences between the area captured and enlarging features of interest. Image (2) is a magnified version of the standard perspective to compare fine detail on a computer. Image 4 is the optical zoom photo, magnified on a computer. You can see
differences in quality in the magnified images, particularly the edges of the rocket casing and detail in human footprints.

Figure 8. Two photos, Images 5 and 7 taken at a height of 119 meters using the same methodology as above. Differences
in the rocket casing can be seen in Images 6 and 8, plus clearer lines and sharper edges in the vehicle remains in Image 8.
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drone expertise to collaboratively
find ways of making an impact. The
equipment and software used for this
project were purely COTS, meaning
that it’s all about applied usage and
know-how.
A few operational questions arose
along the way, such as the policy regarding wearing personal protective
equipment (PPE) while operating
near SHAs or CHAs. Project members determined that it is up to the
site manager (e.g., a TFM) to have the
last say where and when PPE needs to
be worn.
LAND-RELEASE
One of the foundations of land release is the non-intrusive gathering
and checking of as much evidence as
possible, with drones being an asset
to help leverage or augment the value
of other assets by providing additional site-specific data. Dronts will not
Figure 9. Shown is an example of a customized consumer drone demining machine operations map in- replace deminers on the ground in
dicating the slope of terrain. It can be taken into the field electronically, or as a laminated hard copy. the foreseeable future, and they won’t
As most demining machines have a limit regarding the gradient at which they can work, slope maps can
replace human intelligence. What
help operational planning.
they can do is provide additional targeted information to help gain better
LESSONS LEARNED
productivity from human, mechanical, and animal assets.
The ability of small consumer quadcopter drones to remain stationDecisions regarding each site need to be made on a case-by-case baary by hovering presents a lot of potential opportunities for inspections
sis; however, gaining confidence in indicators that better pinpoint eviand reconnaissance, particularly when a zoom camera is included. In
dence will help target technical surveys and clearance, perhaps starting
addition to traditional HMA tasks, micro models have the added value
from hot spots and working outward. Ideally, discussions regarding
of being well-suited for inspections of damaged buildings in Iraq, Syria,
fade out from hot spots inside CHAs might lead to new ideas regarding
and Libya, as they are used increasingly during IEDD operations, looktargeted technical survey that saves time and resources. Gaining coning for small objects, such as wires. Examples of inspections are shown
fidence in indicators that suggest the absence of contamination, most
in Figure 4 and Figure 7.
likely combined with other information could lead to an acceleration in
Most drones have a wide-angle lens as standard, which is often better
the amount of land being cancelled or reduced. Decisions need to be risk
for mapping flights. However, as the M2Z illustrated, the flexibility to
and evidence-based, combining data from various sources, and include
zoom produced both acceptable mapping quality and offered improved
both ground and aerial assets, as an area may not be deemed hazard-free
results for inspection and reconnaissance. A minimum standoff dispurely based on no visible signs.
tance from the ground, obstructions or possible hazards will need to be
HUMANS IN HMA
specified in drone standard operating procedures, meaning that zoom
Removing explosive hazards is important, but the process of doing so
capabilities from an altitude or standoff distance of 15–30 meters will
can be slow and expensive. Being embedded in remote demining operabe useful. Being able to dynamically zoom using the M2Z is practical
tions meant ties to the community. Meeting local villagers and repreand comes at virtually no extra cost. An additional element that the ausentatives from the regional government helped teach project members
thors will monitor is heat dissipation, as the electronics seemed to heat
about the needs of the local population, who are the actual beneficiaup more while in operation than slightly larger drone alternatives. There
ries of HMA work. What do they believe is most important? The road or
are restrictions regarding the size of drones allowed to be used in HMA
shortcuts linking the north to N’Djamena?
operations in some countries. Being a micro size, the sub-1 kilogram
model fits within such restrictions.
BEYOND RESEARCH
A lessoned learned relating to Figure 4, was that a drone is a fast reconEven though there are research components, the scope of this projnaissance tool, compared to otherwise having to open technical survey
ect extends further because an operational framework for drone usage
lanes for inspecting suspected hot spots; i.e., flying in from outside the
needs to be implemented. Together with the HCND, HI and Mobility
CHA to capture evidence points. This doesn’t negate the need for human
Robotics are launching humanitarian drone operations in Chad for
assets on the ground but could help to gain better efficiency from more
the first time. There are no formal regulations regarding drone ustargeted technical survey. Another lesson learned was the power of being
age, meaning that approvals are required from multiple ministries/auable to digitize site information (Figure 5). This led to greater collaborathorities, including the Ministry of Defense and Aviation Authority.
tion, with inspection data and cartography reviewed simultaneously; by
Importing equipment can be a challenge, and delays in customs clearTFMs, the chief of operations and the regional technical advisor.
ance are not uncommon.
Results from the first field campaign suggest that progress can be
Building capacity by training pilots is another goal, as recruiting the
made in innovating processes, gaining synergy by blending HMA and
right candidates improves sustainability once the Odyssey2025 project
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concludes. Dront equipment has been selected to provide local teams
with field kits that are fit for purpose. Information technology equipment is being procured, including powerful laptop computers, a desktop
processing workstation, and archival-storage system to handle the large
volume of data generated. These must be located at the base in northern
Chad, as self-sufficiency is required due to poor internet connectivity.
Workshops will be held for government ministries and other humanitarian organizations in Chad to prompt thoughts regarding drone potential in other areas.
Logistics are also important. For safety, a minimum of two vehicles
must travel together when venturing into the Sahara Desert, with a medic often required as a precaution. If multiple drone teams are deploying
simultaneously to five locations, they require ten off-road vehicles, 10
drivers, five medics, five pilots, five observers, and sharing the resource
of a technical specialist, such as a TFM. Such elements may affect the
scalability of drone operations.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Results from the desert field trial helped to establish proof that, when
tailored effectively, imagery can help augment other assets and suggest
ways to gain operational efficiencies. Two modes of operation were established: inspection and cartography. Work will continue to increase
the depth and breadth of the ground-sign catalogue, and field test the
validity of each indicator.
Time and resources permitting, a satellite data study may take place,
conducting a trade-off analysis using drone data for calibration to
ground-truth space data.
During the next two field campaigns, a number of different categories
of drones and sensors will be tested in a desert environment, with capabilities matched to mission objectives.
Ideally, enough sample data sets will be captured from in the field to
use as a proof of concept for future initiatives utilizing artificial intelligence, deep learning and machine vision techniques for automated analysis. Lessons learned will be shared through in-depth case studies.
Capacity-building will commence during the next mission, providing
equipment, teaching Chadian pilots how to operate drones and about the
processes required to convert data into actionable intelligence.
See endnotes page 71
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tamination from landmines and cluster munitions. How are organizations mitigating the risks
these explosives pose to civilians and what kind of clearance activities are being conducted? Are
mine risk education programs eﬀective at limiting casualties? What types of explosive hazards are
organizations encountering and what techniques are being used to defeat improvised landmines
created in domestic workshops?

Afghanistan
As one of the most mined countries in the world, how are organizations working in Afghanistan
countering legacy landmines and the removal of improvised explosive devices (IED), while incorporating community awareness and risk education into clearance operations? How are organizations
adapting to clearance requirements in urban environments? What lessons can be learned from this
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ammunition due to poor physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices at arms depots,
highlight the need for increased international cooperation to combat these threats. Is more widespread
application of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) the solution? What can be done
to make the IATG more user-friendly and applicable for States with limited resources and training? And
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forces. In areas where humanitarian access is possible, how do organizations determine whether explosive hazards are active or not? To what degree are humanitarian organizations responding to clearance
requests normally reserved for military units?
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